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Non-technical summary
Research Question
It has long been understood that a key economic role of families is to provide insurance
within the family when insurance outside the family is incomplete. We investigate the
effects of families on aggregate employment and labor force participation in a frictional
labor market model. In particular, we ask whether a model with families helps to explain
aggregate labor market variables.
Contribution
We develop a theoretical model with labor market frictions, incomplete financial markets
and with households which have two members. Households face unemployment risks but
their members adjust their labor supplies to insure against unemployment. We use the
model to explain the cyclical properties of aggregate employment and participation.
Results
As in the US data, the model predicts that the participation rate (the fraction of in-
dividuals that want jobs) is not strongly correlated with aggregate economic activity.
This property is in sharp contrast to the strongly procyclical participation predicted by
both neoclassical models and models with search frictions, when we assume bachelor
households or households with infinitely many members (complete markets). In the two
member household model and in the data, primary earners are always in the labor force,
secondary earners have a mildly countercyclical participation rate and a mildly procyclical
employment rate. Their behavior insures the household against unemployment risks.
Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Fragestellung
Es ist bereits seit Langem bekannt, dass eine wesentliche wirtschaftliche Bedeutung von
Familien darin besteht, innerhalb der Familie eine Absicherung zu bieten, wenn die Ab-
sicherung außerhalb der Familie unvollsta¨ndig ist. Wir untersuchen anhand eines friktio-
nellen Arbeitsmarktmodells, wie sich familia¨re Bindungen auf die Gesamtbescha¨ftigung
und die Erwerbsbeteiligung auswirken. Vor allem beleuchten wir die Frage, ob sich durch
ein Modell, das Familien beru¨cksichtigt, die Variablen am Gesamtarbeitsmarkt erkla¨ren
lassen.
Beitrag
Wir entwickeln ein theoretisches Modell, dem Friktionen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt, unvoll-
sta¨ndige Finanzma¨rkte und private Haushalte mit zwei Haushaltsmitgliedern zugrunde
gelegt werden. Fu¨r die privaten Haushalte besteht zwar die Gefahr einer Arbeitslosigkeit,
aber ihre Mitglieder passen ihr Arbeitskra¨fteangebot an, um sich gegen Arbeitslosigkeit
abzusichern. Mithilfe des Modells erkla¨ren wir die zyklischen Eigenschaften der Gesamt-
bescha¨ftigung und Erwerbsbeteiligung.
Ergebnisse
Ebenso wie die US-Daten la¨sst das Modell erkennen, dass der Anteil der Arbeitssuchenden
an den Erwerbspersonen nicht stark mit der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung korre-
liert. Diese Eigenschaft steht in deutlichem Gegensatz zur in hohem Maße prozyklischen
Er-werbsbeteiligung, auf die sowohl neoklassische Modelle als auch Modelle mit Such-
friktionen unter Zugrundelegung von Singlehaushalten oder Haushalten mit unendlich
vielen Mitgliedern (vollsta¨ndige Ma¨rkte) hindeuten. In dem auf Zweipersonenhaushal-
ten basierenden Modell und in den Daten zeigt sich, dass der Erstverdiener stets zu den
Erwerbspersonen za¨hlt, wa¨hrend fu¨r den Zweitverdiener eine leicht antizyklische Erwerbs-
quote sowie eine leicht prozyklische Bescha¨ftigungsquote fest-gestellt werden. Durch dieses
Verhalten sichert sich der Privathaushalt gegen die Gefahr einer Arbeitslosigkeit ab.
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1 Introduction
Economic decisions such as whether or not to work and whether or not to search for
jobs are made jointly in the family. When financial markets are incomplete, as they are
in the real world, these decisions are influenced by the incentive of households to insure
themselves against shocks to their labor income. Unemployment is such a shock, and
families can be an important insurance device against it.
To see this, consider the following example: Assume that a family consists of two
members; one of the members is employed and the other member is out of the labor force.
This is a pattern that we observe frequently in the US data; typically, primary earners
are husbands and secondary earners are wives. Assume further that the economy is in
recession, the separation rate from employment is high and the job finding probability is
low. If the husband loses his job during the recession, then household income suffers a big
shock. To provide insurance against this shock the wife may join the labor force; she will
look for a job (and hence become unemployed) or accept job offers and become employed.
We show that this simple mechanism which the literature calls the “added worker
effect” (AWE) can resolve an extremely persistent puzzle: in the US data, aggregate
employment is procyclical but the labor force participation, the fraction of the popula-
tion that wants to work, is not correlated with aggregate economic activity. This fact
is in sharp contradiction with many macroeconomic models of the business cycle. For
example, in search-theoretical models of the labor market (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), and Pissarides (2000)) the labor force is the sum of the employed and unemployed
individuals. These models predict that participation rises sharply during economic expan-
sions (Veracierto (2008) and Tripier (2004)). Moreover, in the “neoclassical” labor supply
models of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), and more recently Chang and Kim (2006,
2007, 2014), Gourio and Noual (2006) and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), the labor force
is all employed individuals; these models also predict a very procyclical participation in
the labor market.
The model that we propose in this paper can resolve the puzzle. We present a general
equilibrium framework with search frictions in the labor market, and incomplete insur-
ance markets (as in Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1998)). The novelty of our
framework is that we assume that in every household there are two members. Therefore,
relative to the considerable literature on heterogenous agents and wealth accumulation,
which typically assumes “bachelor” households, we add a second member to the family.
Following this literature we assume that the household members are ex ante identical;
they differ only in terms of their productivity endowments. Idiosyncratic productivity
becomes the statistic which determines which household member is the primary earner
(the husband) and which is the secondary earner (the wife). The model is very tractable
and abstracts from other forms of heterogeneity which we do not need anyway: with
the simple structure that we propose, we can match very accurately the intra-household
patterns of employment, unemployment and labor force participation.
To generate transitions across labor market states, the model possesses two key mech-
anisms: First, the search frictions are modeled by assuming a low probability of receiving
a job offer in each period and by assuming that jobs are destroyed exogenously, through
separation shocks. These are standard ingredients of search and matching models. Sec-
ond, idiosyncratic productivity and household wealth exert an influence on labor supply;
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when individuals experience a drop in productivity and the family is wealthy, the reserva-
tion wage is higher than the actual wage. Then individuals withdraw from employment.
This feature of the model follows the standard neoclassical labor supply arguments (e.g.
Chang and Kim (2006, 2007), Gourio and Noual (2006)). The model, therefore, combines
the two key macroeconomic channels to generate fluctuations in the labor market.
We show that the first channel (the frictions) is relevant mainly for primary earners.
These are the most productive individuals, which the family wants to keep employed.
The secondary earners are mainly the out of the labor force individuals. For them, the
frictions are not that relevant; it is reservation wages that determine their participation
patterns.
Over the business cycle the frictions shift along with total factor productivity. This
makes transitions into unemployment more likely during economic recessions, and the
duration of unemployment longer. In response to these shocks there are two main chan-
nels that influence the behavior of individuals: First, due to the standard intertemporal
substitution effects (see Veracierto (2008)), participation becomes very procyclical. Job
opportunities are scarce in recessions and search is costly; therefore, individuals look for
jobs in expansions, when expected costs are lower. Second, the family insurance channel:
since it is more likely that primary earners become unemployed in recessions, and the
expected duration of unemployment is longer, secondary earners wish to enter the labor
force to provide insurance. We show that these two important aspects of intertemporal
optimization are balanced over the cycle; labor force participation becomes acyclical.
We find strong empirical support in favor of the family insurance channel in the data.
First, when we look at the micro data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), there is
indeed a substantial response of female labor force participation to spousal unemployment.
This is in line with the earlier literature on the AWE (e.g. Lundberg (1985) and Stephens
(2002) among others). We illustrate that the response may not only occur right after
the unemployment shock, but also with a lag, in the months that follow the shock. This
pattern is matched by the model: Since we assume incomplete markets, household wealth
is reduced during unemployment. Then, standard wealth effects induce secondary earners
to join the labor force when the unemployment shock arrives, but also in the months
thereafter.
Second, in the aggregate data we also find strong support in favor of family insurance.
We show that i) the labor force participation of married women is negatively correlated
with the business cycle, and ii) the employment rate of women is not strongly procyclical
and exhibits moderate volatility. The model can match these facts because secondary
earners join the labor force and therefore (some of them) become employed during down-
turns. In contrast, primary earners exhibit a more procyclical and volatile employment
pattern due to the impact of the frictions.
To show clearly that these facts are in sharp contradiction with the existing macroeco-
nomic theories of the business cycle, we compare the performance of our new framework
with the bachelor households model of incomplete markets and with the complete market
model. As is well known, in the bachelors model, household wealth becomes an important
state variable. Indeed, a considerable body of literature has shown that, in the presence
of idiosyncratic income risks, individuals save for self-insurance purposes. This feature
is completely absent when we assume complete financial markets: in this case household
wealth does not exert any influence on allocations.
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The couple households model we present in this paper is somewhere in-between these
two extremes. As we show, couples do not want to save as much as bachelors do, because
they can utilize joint labor supply as an alternative self-insurance margin. Furthermore,
couples allocate their most productive members in the labor force, a standard feature of
the complete market allocation. However, because financial markets remain incomplete
in the couples model, some families are unlucky in the labor market and as a consequence
their wealth is low. These households typically have both of their members in the labor
market, even if one of the members (or both) is (are) unproductive. This is a well-known
property of the bachelor households model, that in the presence of borrowing restrictions
unproductive and poor individuals are part of the labor force because reservation wages
drop with wealth.
These observations are crucial to demonstrating that, heterogeneity derives from differ-
ent sources across the models. Comparing their cyclical properties is therefore interesting
also for this reason. Our findings are that both the bachelors and the complete mar-
ket models predict a very procyclical and volatile participation rate. Whether wealth
is the important state variable which influences the participation margin or idiosyncratic
productivity is the important state does not alter conclusions. However, the resulting com-
position of effects (between wealth and productivity across models) matter for the cyclical
behavior of other quantities, most notably for the behavior of aggregate consumption and
wages.
This paper brings several new insights to the literature and relates to several strands.
First, a very common perception among macroeconomists is that, even though insurance
through financial markets is limited, assuming complete markets is a valid simplification
because families are typically larger than one individual. For example, Robert E. Hall
(2009) states the following:
“I do not believe that in the US economy, consumption during unemployment behaves
literally according to the model of full insurance against unemployment risk. But families
and friends may provide partial insurance. I view the full insured case as a good and
convenient approximation to the more complicated reality...”
This very common perception is further reinforced by the fact that research in macroe-
conomics has not shown (to our knowledge) striking differences between the bachelors and
the complete market models, at least not in terms of the behavior of the aggregate econ-
omy and the business cycle fluctuations.1 Our results stand in sharp contrast to this
wide-held view. We find that the couples model produces vastly different behavior for the
labor market, relative to the bachelors and the complete market models, which lead to
basically the same predictions. This result highlights that studying explicitly the decisions
of families under incomplete markets is important.
A few recent papers have moved towards this direction. Guler, Guvenen, and Vi-
olante (2012) construct a search-theoretical model with couple households to show that
joint search presents households with the opportunity to increase income. In their model
individuals receive random offers from a wage distribution; employed individuals quit
voluntarily into unemployment when their spouse receives a high wage offer. Through
1It is, for example, well-known that the wealth inequality in heterogeneous agents models does not
affect the business cycle properties of aggregate capital, investment and consumption (e.g. Krusell and
Smith (1998)). On the other hand, assuming incomplete markets has been shown to be important for
optimal fiscal policy (e.g. Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009)).
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taking turns being employed, households can then climb up the wage ladder. This com-
parative advantage motive is not present in our model.2 When primary earners become
unemployed and secondary earners enter the labor force, this not driven by a comparative
advantage: Secondary earners enter the labor force to provide insurance, not to replace
the primary earner in the labor market. In the CPS data we find strong support in favor
of the insurance argument, whereas we find no evidence (at least in terms of the monthly
flows that we analyze) in favor of the comparative advantage motive.
Our analysis is intimately related to the recent work of Blundell, Pistaferri, and
Saporta-Eksten (2014). They estimate, using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) data, a life cycle model which features couples, idiosyncratic productivity risks,
and wealth accumulation. Since their data has an annual frequency, they rightfully omit
frictions from their model. They find that families provide insurance against labor income
shocks through adjusting hours worked. Our results are complementary to theirs. We
focus on short-term unemployment shocks which are precisely identified in the CPS data
and document how they can affect desired labor supply and participation patterns more
broadly. We show that household search helps households circumvent the frictions in the
labor market, whereas Blundell et al. (2014) find that joint hours insulate the household’s
budget from more persistent productivity shocks. Theirs is a life cycle model, which can
be conveniently mapped to the data and used to assess the welfare effects from insur-
ance; ours is an infinite horizon macro-model which explores the business cycle impact of
intra-household decisions.
A large literature which studies business cycles in neoclassical models and assumes
an extensive margin of labor supply, has identified the importance of “marginal workers”
for aggregate employment fluctuations. Chang and Kim (2006, 2007), Gourio and Noual
(2006) and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) (among many others) follow in this vein.
Married women are undeniably an important group of marginal workers and yet the data
patterns that we identify go against the view that they contribute much to fluctuations
in the labor market.3 Many papers in this literature look at different “marginal worker
groups” than we do; for example, they study young and low-income individuals. In
principle, our theory could become pertinent for other groups too. However, our model
does not have an elaborate life cycle structure. This matters because young individuals
enter the labor market even when wages are low in order to accumulate human capital,
become economically independent from their parents. These features are omitted from
the model.
Our work is also closely related to a recent stream of papers which study search models
with three labor market states: employment, unemployment and participation, see for
examples Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson, and S¸ahin (2011),
and Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson, and S¸ahin (2012). Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005)
present a search and matching model assuming that heterogeneity derives from temporary
shocks to preferences. Krusell et al. (2012) use a model similar to ours (with household
2Guler et al. (2012) show that their mechanism is weakened when households can save.
3A few papers have looked at the impact of tax policies on female labor market participation, sometimes
finding sizable effects (see for example Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2012) and the references
therein; see also Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012)). Our results do not go against these findings,
since changes in taxes do not lead to increases in the unemployment rates of primary earners. Our
analysis is pertinent for the business cycle.
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wealth and idiosyncratic productivity shocks) to analyze business cycle fluctuations, but
assume bachelor households. In contrast to all of these papers, our focus is on analyzing
the effects of introducing a second member to the household, maintaining the assumption
that markets are incomplete.
Our results are relevant for the design of tax policies and benefits. First, optimal
unemployment insurance policies should be influenced by the insurance margins that
households possess. This has been demonstrated for the case of household savings by a
series of papers (see for example Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992), Wang and Williamson
(2002) and Young (2004), among others). Second, many papers have shown that the
incentive of households to accumulate precautionary savings exerts a crucial influence on
the optimal capital tax (e.g. Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and Conesa et al. (2009)).
Since we have shown that precautionary savings are less important for couple households,
it would be interesting to apply the insights of this literature to the couples model. Finally,
Arseneau and Chugh (2009, 2012) have demonstrated that the tax smoothing result of
Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppa¨la¨ (2002) is reversed in the presence of search and
matching frictions in the labor market. Their analysis assumes that the labor force is
exogenously fixed. As the authors acknowledge, this is crucial to generate excess tax
volatility as a Ramsey outcome. The interplay between the optimal tax smoothing model
and the forces we identify in this paper remains to be explored.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical analysis. It describes
some key aggregate labor market facts from the US and presents the estimates of the
AWE using microeconomic data from the CPS. Section 3 presents the model and Section
4 calibrates the model. Section 5 discusses the behavior of the model in the steady
state. Section 6 contains the main results. Section 7 reports sensitivity of these results
to different parameterizations of the model. A final section concludes.
2 The US Labor Market
We first discuss the cyclical behavior of US labor market variables, both, in the aggregate
and for specific subgroups, particularly for primary and secondary earners. Then, we show
the monthly labor market flows across the three states: employment, unemployment and
out of the labor force. Finally, we document joint search behavior in US households using
micro data.
2.1 Business Cycles
2.1.1 Aggregate Moments
Table 1 summarizes the US labor market business cycle statistics. The data are con-
structed from the CPS and correspond to observations spanning the years 1994 (January)
to 2014 (October). The unemployment rate (U-rate) is very counter-cyclical and more
than 10 times as volatile as aggregate output. The employment rate (E-pop) has more
than 80 percent of the volatility of output at business cycle frequencies and is very pro-
cyclical.4 The labor force (LF), the sum of all individuals who are either employed or
4More recent observations contributed to an increase in the volatility of aggregate employment, which
now accounts for more than two thirds of the volatility of aggregate output.
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unemployed (as a percentage of the total), is not volatile and its contemporaneous corre-
lation with GDP is low (0.34).
According to the definitions provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, individuals
are employed if they have been working during the month of the CPS survey; unemployed
are those individuals who are not working, though they want jobs and search in the
labor market. Therefore, according to the official definitions, the civilian labor force is
all individuals who want to work. The moments presented suggest that the fraction of
these individuals over the total US population (older than age 16), hardly varies with the
business cycle.
Table 1: Aggregate Labor Market Business Cycle Statistics
E-pop U-rate LF LF+NS
σx
σY
0.86 10.15 0.27 0.22
ρx,Y 0.81 -0.90 0.34 0.09
Note: The table shows averages of labor market aggregates. The data are extracted
from the CPS and correspond to the years 1994 (January)-2014 (October). E-pop is
the employment population rate, U-rate is the unemployment rate (total number of
unemployed over number of employed + unemployed) and LF (LF + NS) refers to
the labor force participation rate (including non-searchers, see description in text).
All data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, logged and HP-filtered with a parameter
of 1600. See online data appendix for further details on the variables.
In the 4th column of the table we document the behavior of an alternative and more
broadly defined measure of labor force participation. It includes the so called “non-
searchers” (also known as “marginal attached individuals”); these are individuals who
state in the CPS interviews that they want to work, however they do not look for jobs.
Because they do not search, or they search too little, they are considered in official statis-
tics in the US as out of the labor force. As the moments illustrate, the quantity LF+NS
is also acyclical in the US data. Its contemporaneous correlation with GDP is even lower,
and essentially equal to 0.
Though it is unusual to include the non-searchers in the pool of labor force partic-
ipants we have added the last column in Table 1 to show that the precise definition of
participation is not important for our conclusions. In our analysis we will follow official
definitions; we will assume that the labor force consists of employed and unemployed
individuals. This is also the convention followed by the considerable literature of search
and matching models (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)).5
2.1.2 Primary and Secondary Earners
In Table 2 we document the cyclical behavior of employment, unemployment and partic-
ipation for various demographic groups. We begin by documenting the cyclical patterns
5Two exceptions are Hall (2005) and Krusell et al. (2011). These papers consider non-searchers as part
of unemployment. Jones and Riddell (1999) showed that non-searchers in Canada have roughly half the
probability of flowing to employment, than unemployed individuals do. In the CPS data we found that
the monthly transition to employment for non-searchers is 14.5% (vs. 26% for unemployed individuals).
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for married men and women. From the table we see the following: First, the labor force
participation of married women is counter-cyclical; the contemporaneous correlation with
GDP is -0.23. Second, participation is more volatile for women than for men. The ra-
tio of standard deviations (σLF
σY
) equals 0.42 for women vs. 0.19 for men. Finally, the
employment rate of women is weakly correlated with aggregate economic activity (0.45).
Panel C of the table looks at the business cycle moments for “household heads”. These
include married men, but also individuals that are not married, either living on their own,
or with other individuals in the household (for example, single men/women with children
in the household).6 As the table shows, the business cycle patterns for household heads are
very similar to the analogous moments for married men. The contemporaneous correlation
of participation with GDP is 0.27 (vs. 0.12 for married men) and the relative standard
deviation is 0.22 (vs. 0.21).
It is typical to interpret the “bachelor households” model under incomplete markets,
as a model that is suitable to study the behavior of household heads. Therefore, the
moments reported in the third panel of the table represent the targets for this model. On
the other hand, the couples model that this paper studies adds another member to the
household. The data counterpart are married men and women.
In the last panel of Table 2 we study the behavior of a broader group of “secondary
earners”, including children along with married women. We now see that, in terms of the
business cycle moments, the behavior of this group, differs somewhat from the behavior
of married women alone. Though participation remains acyclical, employment becomes
more procyclical and volatile. This fact is well known (see for example Jaimovich and
Siu (2009) and Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu (2013)); younger individuals have more volatile
employment and hours patterns. This explains the larger variability we now see in the
data. As discussed previously, we will leave children outside the model. Though, we could
(hypothetically) extend the family insurance argument to children7, our model abstracts
from schooling and does not contain an elaborate life cycle structure.
2.2 Labor Market Flows
In order to deal with the acyclicality of labor force participation, search theoretic models
of the labor market have assumed that the labor force is fixed. This assumption is at
odds with the substantial flows from employment (E) and unemployment (U) to out of
the labor force (O) and the flows from O into the labor force. This fact is well known,
656% of “household heads” are married men. A small fraction (16.5% of the US population older
than age 16) are singles, not married and living with no other relatives in the household. These include
retirees, divorcees with children living outside the household, widowers with children and grandchildren,
college students etc.
7For example, we could claim that college students receiving transfers from their parents (e.g. Keane
and Wolpin (2001)) are affected by unemployment shocks in the family. It would be interesting to know
whether they begin to work partime in response to such shocks. This, however, is (probably) difficult to
test: We suspect that in the CPS the participation status of college students is very imprecisely measured.
In this example, students are simultaneously employed and out of the labor force, it is questionable
whether the structure of the CPS survey can accurately identify both.
Moreover, young individuals work even when wages are low to accumulate human capital, become
economically independent, become more attractive in the marriage market and so on. It is not clear that
we can think of them as secondary earners in their current household.
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Table 2: Labor Market Business Cycle Statistic For Selected Population Groups
E-pop U-rate LF LF+NS
A: Married men
σx
σY
0.71 14.71 0.21 0.19
ρx,Y 0.79 -0.90 0.12 -0.11
B: Married Women
σx
σY
0.57 10.38 0.43 0.42
ρx,Y 0.45 -0.85 -0.23 -0.36
C: Household Heads
σx
σY
0.79 13.27 0.22 0.48
ρx,Y 0.81 -0.87 0.27 -0.01
D: Women + Children
σx
σY
0.95 8.67 0.37 0.60
ρx,Y 0.77 -0.88 0.30 -0.10
Note: The table shows averages of labor market aggregates for selected subgroups from
the CPS 1994-2014. Panels A and B show the business cycle labor market moments for
married men and women. Panel C studies the behavior of “household heads”. Panel
D considers the moments for women and children. Details on the data can be found
in the online appendix.
here we look at the transitions of individuals across labor market states in a more recent
sample.
In Table 3 we report the average transition probabilities for the population in the years
1994 -2014. Each month roughly 7% of all individuals who are O, join the labor force, and
2.8% of all employed individuals (and 23.5% of unemployed individuals) become inactive.8
These numbers are obviously substantial. Over our sample period there are more workers
flowing from E to O than to U and more workers moving from O to E each month, than
from U to E. Therefore, assuming a fixed labor force is a poor approximation of the US
labor market data.
In Table 4 we look at married men and women and household heads. We show that
married men typically have higher flow rates from E to U and lower rates from E to O.
Married women, on the other hand, have substantially larger flows than men from E to
O (3.1% v.s. 1.5%) and from U to O (27% v.s. 14.8%). Overall, married men are more
attached to the labor force.
It has been argued (see for example Clark and Summers (1979), Krusell et al. (2011)),
that flows from U to O are temporary. This could mean that they reflect temporary shocks
(for example to preferences) which induce individuals to flow to out of the labor force and
8Arguably, part of the OE flow could reflect a time aggregation bias; within the month individuals
may first flow from O to U and subsequently to E, but the CPS does not observe the unemployment
spell. Moreover, Nagypa´l (2005) argues that around 40% of the transitions from E to O result in a
flow directly to employment in the next month. Some of these workers, have searched for a job while
employed, obtained an offer but the new job starts in one month. In the online data appendix we verified
that the CPS data is consistent with this interpretation. In particular, when we looked at the behavior
of prime aged married men who flow from E to O, we found that roughly half of them move back to
employment one or two months after the transition. We can infer that Nagypal’s findings are relevant in
our data set.
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Table 3: Monthly Flow Rates: Aggregate
To
From E U O
E 0.959 0.013 0.028
U 0.249 0.516 0.235
O 0.045 0.026 0.930
Note: The table shows average monthly transition probabilities across the three labor
market states: employment E, unemployment U and O. The flows are computed from
the CPS data and correspond to the years 1994-2014. Details on the data can be found
in the online appendix.
Table 4: Monthly Flow Rates: Selected Groups
A: Married Men B: Married Women C: Household Heads
To To To
From E U O E U O E U O
E 0.976 0.010 0.015 0.961 0.008 0.031 0.973 0.011 0.016
U 0.288 0.564 0.148 0.241 0.488 0.271 0.252 0.572 0.176
O 0.037 0.015 0.948 0.040 0.016 0.944 0.029 0.017 0.955
Note: The table shows average monthly transition probabilities across the three labor
market states: employment E, unemployment U and O for selected subgroups. Panels
A and B show the flow rates for husbands and wives, respectively, while panel C shows
the rates for household heads. See the online data appendix for further details on how
the estimates are constructed.
subsequently flow back in.9 Since our theory will built on shocks to idiosyncratic produc-
tivity solely, which is persistent in the data, it will be difficult to match this probability,
the same problem is identified by Krusell et al. (2011). However, through documenting
the transition probabilities separately for married men and women, we can identify an
important economic force beyond temporary innovations to preferences, explaining why
these flows are substantial: they are influenced by intra-household decisions.
In the online appendix we show that the above patterns also hold for individuals aged
25-55. This means that the flow rates documented in Tables 3 and 4 are not driven by
retirees or by new entrants in the labor market. The business cycle patterns documented
in Tables 1 and 2 also do not change.
9Another possibility is that U to O flows are large if it takes time for job applications to become
successful. Consider the following example: In month t individual i is unemployed, she has just send
applications to vacancies. If these applications are not answered by t+ 1, it may be optimal to postpone
further search. It is also plausible that the individual has found a job, but her employment begins in (for
example) two months. The large UO rates in this case are consistent with the findings of Nagypa´l (2005)
previously mentioned.
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2.3 Joint Search in US Households
In this section we provide evidence of joint search in US households. We use the data from
the CPS to estimate the impact of the husband’s unemployment spell on the wife’s labor
force participation decision. Following the literature on the AWE (see Lundberg (1985)
and Stephens (2002) among others) we focus on the behavior husbands and wives. We
ask whether an unemployment spell suffered by the husband influences the labor supply
of the wife, and in particular, whether it influences the probability that she joins the labor
force, flowing either to employment or to unemployment.
2.3.1 Response of Female Participation to Spousal Unemployment
The first column of Table 5 shows the results from a linear probability model. We estimate
the following equation:
Transitioni,t = αEUm,t + Zt,iζ + Time Dummies + χi,t(1)
The variable Transitioni,t is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the wife joins the
labor force in t (conditional on not being in the labor force in t− 1) and zero otherwise.
EUm,t is a dummy which equals 1 if the husband becomes unemployed in t. Zt,i is a set
of demographic variables (age, education, race etc). Our data refers to families where
both the husband and the wife are older than age 24 and younger than 56, to eliminate
retirement, and new entrants in the labor market. We further, restrict our sample to
consider husbands who are employed in a given month t − 1 and either employed or
unemployed in month t; wives are out of the labor force in t− 1 and may remain O in t,
or join the labor force (flow to E or U).
According to the results shown in Column (1) of the table, when the husband becomes
unemployed the wife is 7.7% more likely to flow into the labor force. This effect is
measured by the coefficient on the variable EUm,t. Since in the sample considered, the
overall probability that wives flow into the labor force is in the order of 9.5%, spousal
unemployment nearly doubles the entry rate of married women.
Column (2) decomposes the husband’s unemployment spell into three sources: the
variable “Loss” represents unemployment spells that are due to permanent job losses, the
variable “Quit” is spells initiated when the husband quits his job, and “Layoff” represents
spells in which the work is suspended for a given period, but the husband expects (with
some positive probability) a call back from his previous employer. The results suggest
that losses lead to a 10.3% rise in the probability that the wife joins the labor force, quits
to a 9% and layoffs to a 3.9% increase, all relative to a couple where the husband remains
employed in both months.
These numbers could seem surprising if one thinks of quits as being initiated on the
worker’s side and losses or layoffs on the firm’s side. Workers that quit must, all else equal,
be better placed to deal with separations than workers that get fired, this should attenuate
substantially the AWE. One explanation for why quits and losses lead to a similar response
is that, in most cases, job losers claim unemployment benefits from the government and/or
are given severance compensation by their employers.10 Put differently, workers that
10Benefits and severance compensation are not substitutes. In many US states unemployment benefits
are not reduced when the worker has received a severance package (see for example Oikonomou, 2014).
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Table 5: Static Added Worker Effect
1 2
EUm 0.0773***
(0.0047)
Lossm 0.1036***
(0.0069)
Layoffm 0.039***
(0.0073)
Quitm 0.0905***
(0.0175)
No of Kids -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004)
No of Kids ≤ 5 -0.0238*** -0.0238***
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Whitef 0.0118*** 0.0117***
(0.0016) (0.0016)
Blackf 0.0505*** 0.0504***
(0.0028) (0.0028)
Educ.f 0.0045* 0.0044*
(0.0025) (0.0025)
Educ.m 0.0209*** 0.0208***
(0.0023) (0.0023)
Educ.f
2 0.0012*** 0.0013***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Educ.m
2 -0.0048*** -0.0048***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Agef -0.0027 -0.0024
(0.0049) (0.0049)
Agef
2 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Agef
3 -1.4E-06 -1.32E-06
(1.05E-06) (1.05E-06)
Agem -0.0218*** -0.0213***
(0.0053) (0.0053)
Agem
2 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Agem
3 -3.7E-06*** -3.64E-06***
(1.08E-06) (1.08E-06)
R2 0.0101 0.0101
Observations 401793 401543
Note: The table shows estimates from the linear probability model. The data are monthly and
are derived from the CPS spanning the years 1994-2014. The sample is composed of married
individuals (age 25-55). All regressions include month (time) dummies. Regression 1 estimates
the AWE pooling all types of unemployment spells into one variable. Regression 2 differentiates
between the three unemployment categories as discussed in the main text. ∗∗∗ is Significant at
1 percent. ∗∗ is Significant at 5 percent and ∗ is Significant at 10 percent level.
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are eligible for unemployment insurance in the US are job losers and not job quitters.
Moreover, severance payments (in principle) are given after a termination that is initiated
by the firm, this corresponds more accurately to the case the job is lost than to the case
the worker quits. To the extent that these payments mitigate the effect unemployment on
the household’s budget, they also mitigate the AWE to the wife’s desired labor supply.11
To explain why layoffs lead to a substantially smaller AWE the following channels have
to be considered: i) A layoff is often a temporary termination of the match and therefore
it does not represent an important shock to the family’s resources. ii) Layoffs are more
likely to be anticipated because of an advance notice (see Ruhm, 1990). In this case,
female labor force participation could be frontloaded and the smaller effect we observe is
due to the fact that wives have already joined the labor force before the husband’s EU
transition.12 We will return to test the relevance of ii) in the next subsection.
2.3.2 Dynamic response of female labor force participation
Looking at the instantaneous response of female participation (as we have thus far) may
be incomplete for several reasons: First, because the change in the desired labor supply
occurs when the household receives information about the unemployment spell, this need
not coincide with the month we observe the spell. Just think of the case where the
husband is given an advance notice of termination, that his job will be lost in 2-3 months.
Second, some families may be slow to react to the unemployment shock. This can, for
example, be due to labor supply adjustment costs (e.g. in the presence of small children);
it can also be because agents fail to realize the magnitude of the shock to labor income,
or (consistent with the model mechanism) because family wealth is run down during the
unemployment spell. In all of these cases, we may observe an AWE in the months that
follow the husband’s EU transition.
We now use our data set to detect whether there is AWE in the two months before or
after the unemployment spell is realized. In Table 6 we document the dynamic responses
of female participation to spousal unemployment. We estimate the following equation
with dynamic panel data:
Transitioni,t =
τ=+2∑
τ=−2
ατI(Husband Becomes U in t− τ) + Zt,iζ + Time Dummies + χi,t
(2)
where Z is again a matrix of demographic characteristics which includes, age, education,
race, number of children and so on, and χi,t is the error term.
11See, for example, Engen and Gruber (2001) for evidence on the importance of this channel. Another
explanation for why quits lead to a substantial AWE is that job terminations no matter where they orig-
inate, derive from the same principle; that the surplus of the match is negative and that the productivity
of the worker is higher elsewhere (see for example Borjas and Rosen, 1980).
12Relative to quits layoffs lead to small AWE also because laid off workers claim unemployment benefits.
The structure of our data set does not allow us to test this directly, however, layoffs and loses are typically
seen in empirical studies as proxies for claiming unemployment benefits (see for example Mukoyama,
Patterson, and Sahin (2014) and the references therein). Hence, we are fairly confident that this effect
shows up in our estimates.
Moreover, Fujita and Moscarini (2013) illustrated that a substantial fraction of laid off workers get call
backs from their previous employers. This proves that i) also holds.
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The idea behind equation (2), is that the ατ coefficients capture the conditional prob-
ability that a wife that has not joined the labor force τ − 1 periods after (before if τ ≤ 0)
the husband’s unemployment spell, will join in the τth period.13
According to the results shown in the first column of the table, there is an AWE that
increases the probability of joining the labor force one month and two months after the
unemployment spell. There is also an effect one month before the spell, and smaller, but
significant, effect two months prior to the spell. The contemporaneous effect is 7.8%,
almost identical to our previous estimate. The coefficient α+1 (one month after) is 5.1%
and the analogous value for α+2 is 3.9%. The lagged terms are 3.1% and 1.9% (α−1 and
α−2 respectively).
Columns 2-4 in the table show separately these dynamic AWEs for layoffs, loses and
quits. The patterns which emerge are consistent with our previous findings; quits and
loses yield larger responses than layoffs.14
Notice that we do not observe significant differences in the coefficients α−1 and α−2
across the three unemployment categories. This suggests that households, two months
before the spell occurs, know that unemployment is likely (for example because the con-
ditions on the job have become worse), however they do not yet know whether the spell
will be a layoff or a permanent job loss. This argument may also apply to the case of
quits since as is well known, quits typically occur following a deterioration of the work
conditions, see for example Nagypa´l (2005).
We previously asked whether the smaller AWE for layoffs shown in Table 5, can be
explained by the fact that families have received news about unemployment, so that the
wife has already joined the labor force. The estimates in Table 6 do not support this
view. If indeed it was the case, then we should see much larger values for α−1 and α−2
than in the case of loses for example.
2.3.3 Comparative Advantage
In equation (2) we have included forward variables to explain female labor market tran-
sitions. One may criticize the estimates of α−1 and α−2 on the grounds that they are
potentially fraught with simultaneity bias; if husbands become unemployed because wives
have decided to join the labor force, then the AWE is not driven by the insurance motive
we claim, it is rather driven by a comparative advantage meaning that the family wants
to make the wife its primary earner.
13Since the CPS tracks individuals for 4 consecutive months, the survey is interrupted for 8 months
and then another four monthly observations are collected, we study transitions ranging from τ = −2 up
until τ = +2. We only look at consecutive observations, to avoid having to deal with censoring issues.
Moreover, since in our data we only have one data point for some households (we drop the household
when the wife joins the labor force) we did not include any fixed effect in our estimation. In the online
data appendix we explain in detail how we constructed the sample to estimate equation (2).
14A noteworthy feature is that quits yield a substantial response one month after the spell. We get
α+1 = 12.2% whereas for loses and layoffs α+1 equals 5.3% and 3.6% respectively. Any of the channels
outlined previously to explain why we observe a lagged AWE in the data, can also explain why the
lagged response in the case of quits is larger. These responses are consistent with the view that workers
that quit do not receive unemployment benefits, therefore household wealth is run down faster during
unemployment. It could also be that husbands quit when they know that their wives can easily join the
labor force; in this case the responses we see, reveal that quits become more likely in families where wives
can provide insurance (because they face low labor supply adjustment costs etc).
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Table 6: Dynamic Added Worker Effect
1: All spells 2: Quits 3:Layoffs 4: Losses
Montht-2 0.0187** 0.0244*** 0.0255*** 0.0202**
(0.0078) (0.008) (0.0079) (0.0079)
Montht-1 0.0315*** 0.0332*** 0.0317*** 0.0325***
(0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055)
Montht 0.0779*** 0.1076*** 0.0422*** 0.0991***
(0.0044) (0.0167) (0.0067) (0.0066)
Montht+1 0.0510*** 0.1221*** 0.0359*** 0.0537***
(0.0054) (0.0215) (0.0084) (0.0082)
Montht+2 0.0396*** 0.0297*** 0.0265*** 0.0453***
(0.0074) (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0085)
No of Kids -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
No of Kids ≤ 5 -0.0224*** -0.0224*** -0.0224*** -0.0224***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Whitef 0.0077*** 0.0078*** 0.0077*** 0.0078***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Blackf 0.0474*** 0.0464*** 0.0467*** 0.047***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Educ.f 0.0039* 0.0038* 0.0039* 0.0034
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Educ.m 0.0172*** 0.0174*** 0.0175*** 0.0177***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Educ.f
2 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0014***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Educ.m
2 -0.0042*** -0.0042*** -0.0041*** -0.0042***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Agef -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Agef
2 -2.79E-05 2.45E-05 2.76E-05 3.15E-05
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Agef c e -6.31E-07 -6.09E-07 -6.31E-07 -6.69E-07
(9.23E-07) (9.27E-07) (9.25E-07) (9.26E-07)
Agem -0.0238*** -0.0233*** -0.0234*** -0.0232***
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Agem
2 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Agem
3 -4.17E-06*** -4.05E-06*** -4.09E-06*** -4.02E-06***
(9.49E-07) (9.53E-07) (9.50E-07) (9.51E-07)
R2 0.0097 0.0091 0.0091 0.0095
Observations 540942 533678 5363285 536669
Note: The table shows estimates of the dynamic responses to spousal unemployment. Model 1
shows the result pooling together all types of spells. Models 2-4 show the results by “unemploy-
ment category” as described in the main text. See Table 5 and the online appendix for details.
∗∗∗ is Significant at or below 1 percent. ∗∗ is Significant at or below 5 percent and ∗ is Significant
at or below 10 percent level.
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In the online appendix we have taken several steps to rule out this possibility. In
particular, we looked at the employment and labor force participation distributions of
husbands and wives one year after we record an AWE. We do not find any evidence sug-
gesting that there is a change in the identity of the household’s primary earner. Husbands
continue having substantially higher employment and labor force participation rates than
their wives. Thus the comparative advantage effect is unlikely; this suggests that our
estimation does not suffer from any bias in this respect.
3 The model
Our benchmark model is a heterogeneous household economy, with incomplete financial
markets, labor market frictions, and aggregate uncertainty. It can been seen as a variant
of the models Krusell and Smith (1998) and Krusell et al. (2012); the key difference
between our framework and the previous papers, is that we add a second member to the
household. In this section we present this new framework.
3.1 Economic Environment
3.1.1 Population and Preferences
We consider an economy with a unit mass of households, each household is inhabited
by two individuals. We assume that preferences are identical across individuals and
households. All agents in the economy discount future utility at rate β. Therefore, this
rate also applies at the household level. Individuals have preferences of the form u(cit, l
i
t)
where i = 1, 2 is an index denoting a household member. cit is consumption of individual
i at time t and lit denotes leisure. At the household level we can represent preferences as:∑2
i=1 u(c
i
t, l
i
t) within the period. We assume uc > 0, ul > 0 and uc,l ≥ 0.
3.1.2 Employment Opportunities
At any point in time a household can be economically active or retired. We model
retirement as an exogenous event. In every period there is a (time invariant) probability
φR that the household retires. If the retirement state is realized the household has to
wait for another shock φA 6= φR in order to become active in the labor market.15 Retired
households are out of the labor force. Non-retired households can choose, separately for
each member, a labor market state (Sit). There are three states: employment (S
i
t = E),
unemployment (Sit = U) and out of the labor force (S
i
t = O). St = (S
1
t , S
2
t ) denotes the
joint labor market status of the household members.
There are frictions in the labor market so that agents who are not employed, but who
want a job, are not guaranteed to find one next period. In order to find a job, they have
to engage in a costly search activity. A higher search effort leads to a higher job finding
probability. Specifically, sit denotes the level of search intensity exerted by individual i
in t. We assume that sit can take on two different values s and s > s. We classify the
15Equivalently, the household dies with probability φA and is subsequently replaced by another house-
hold in the model which inherits the state variables. This simplistic life cycle structure is the similar to
Castaneda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull (2003) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).
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individual as either unemployed or out of labor force based on her search effort sit . In
particular, we assume that:
If sit =

s then Sit = O
s then Sit = U
In words, individual i is out of the labor force if her search intensity is low and is unem-
ployed otherwise.16
Given search intensity sit, a job opportunity arrives at rate p(s
i
t, λt) where λt denotes
total factor productivity. First, we assume that 0 ≤ p(s, λt) < p(s, λt) < 1, meaning that
jobs arrive at a higher rate when search intensity increases. Second, these probabilities
also satisfy: pλ(s
i
t, λt) > 0. Higher values of λt shift the probabilities upwards effectively
leading to higher arrival rates of job opportunities in good times.
Search costs are denoted by κ(sit) and measured in units of foregone leisure. Therefore,
we write: lit = 1 − κ(sit), i.e. leisure is the unitary time endowment less the time cost of
search. Finally, employed individuals spend a fixed fraction h of their time endowment
working so that their leisure is lit = 1− h. Thus, labor supply is formed at the extensive
margin only.
3.1.3 Labor Income Risks
Individuals face idiosyncratic uncertainty in the labor market which derives from several
sources: The first source of risk, which we denote by it, is a stochastic, agent specific,
persistent labor productivity process. t = {1t , 2t} denotes the (vector of) productivity
at the household level.
The second source of uncertainty in the model is a match quality shock. We assume
that an individual loses exogenously his job and is forced to become non-employed at
a rate χ(λt) each period. The third type of risk is the search friction summarized in
the probabilities p(sit, λt). Individuals who are not employed will face the possibility of
remaining jobless for many periods. Since we assume that non-employed individuals earn
zero income, search frictions impart a significant risk to the household’s budget.
Along with these risks, individuals and households will have a set of choices. As
discussed previously, the probabilities p(sit, λt) are determined endogenously. In every
period, each household member draws a new value of it, these draws (along with other
state variables) will determine whether or not it is worthwhile to exert high search effort.
Moreover, since labor supply decisions in our model are formulated at the extensive mar-
gin, some matches will be terminated voluntarily, without the arrival of the χ(λt) shock.
For example, if idiosyncratic productivity it falls, the individual may decide to quit her
job and become non-employed. Similarly, when a non-employed individual receives a job
offer she chooses whether she wants to work, or whether she wants to give up on the offer
and wait for a higher productivity draw and a new job opportunity in the future.
16This classification follows closely the analogous criterion of the CPS, whereby individuals are consid-
ered unemployed if they utilize at least one of the nine methods considered as “Active Search”. See the
online data appendix and Shimer (2004) for further details.
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3.1.4 Technology and Markets
Every match, operates a technology with constant returns to scale and so, without loss
of generality, we can aggregate and represent total production in the economy as Yt =
Kαt (Ltλt)
1−α. Kt and Lt denote the aggregate capital stock and the aggregate labor input
(per efficiency units) respectively. We assume that λt evolves according to the cumulative
density function piλ′|λ = Prob(λt+1 < λ′|λt = λ). Aggregate capital depreciates at rate δ
each period. Moreover, wages per efficiency units of labor (wt) and net interest rates (rt)
are determined in a competitive market. Hence wt is equal to the marginal productivity
of labor and analogously rt + δ equals the marginal product of capital in every period.
Financial markets in the economy are incomplete: we assume that households can
self-insure through trading claims on the aggregate capital stock subject to an ad hoc
borrowing limit. We denote household wealth by at. We also assume that at ∈ A (a
compact set). In our model households cannot borrow. Thus, the lower bound of A is
zero.17 The interest rate earned on savings is rt.
Finally, since agents have to forecast future factor prices, they have to know the current
distribution of agents across the state space. We denote this cumulative density function
by Γt. Γt is a further state variable in the household’s program. The law of motion for this
distribution is given by: Γt+1 = T (Γt, λt) where T gives the transition from the current
Γt and λt to the next period’s distribution.
3.2 Value Functions
We now describe the household’s problem. Following Mazzocco and Yamaguchi (2007),
Cubeddu and R´ıos-Rull (2003), Regalia, Rios-Rull, and Short (1999), we assume that as-
sets are a commonly held resource in the household.18 In addition to wealth, a household’s
state vector includes the productivity levels t, the distribution Γt and the aggregate TFP
λt. We summarize the realizations of these variables with Xt = {at, t,Γt, λt}.
Because of the presence of search frictions, the employment status of the each house-
hold member also has to be introduced as a state variable to the value function. We
have that Sit ∈ {O,U,E} and so the joint status St ≡ (S1t , S2t ) may take nine possible
values. However, there are no frictions between the states O and U . Thus agents can flow
freely across these two states, we can use the search intensity choices of individuals to
keep track of their labor market status. This implies that the status of an individual can
be summarized by two realizations of a (random) state variable: n and e. n corresponds
to the case where the individual does not have a job offer (and therefore she can choose
between O and U) and e applies when a job offer is available (the choice is then between
E, O and U). The joint employment status of the two household members is then summa-
rized into a state variable which takes the following values: {nn, en, ne, ee}. nn applies to
the case the household has both members non-employed; en (ne) when the first (second)
17Since earning zero income is possible in the model, the no borrowing constraint coincides with the
natural borrowing limit. The upper bound of A will arise endogenously in equilibrium. Because the
(average) interest rate is lower than the households’ time preference parameter savings will not diverge
to infinity (e.g. Aiyagari, 1994).
18This assumption is used to simplify the household’s program. It reduces the number of state variables
by one, and ensures that there is one Euler equation for the entire household. Mazzocco and Yamaguchi
(2007) show that this assumption is realistic and consistent with the U.S. data.
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member is employed and the second (first) non-employed and finally, when both members
are employed we have ee. We denote lifetime utilities as V i,j(X), i, j ∈ {n, e}. For retired
households we use the symbol R to denote the state.
Consider now a household which has both of its members non-employed. Assume that
agent 1 gets a job offer in the next period. When this opportunity arrives, and the new
values of the idiosyncratic productivity t+1 are sampled and the aggregate state vector
{Γt+1, λt+1} is revealed, the household will decide whether agent 1 will go to work. This
choice is expressed by: Qen(Xt+1) = max{V nn(Xt+1), V en(Xt+1)}.
Analogously, Qne(Xt+1) = max{V nn(Xt+1), V ne(Xt+1)} defines the choice over keeping
agent 2 non-employed or allocating her to work.
Finally, Qee(Xt+1) = max{V nn(Xt+1), V en(Xt+1), V ne(Xt+1), V ee(Xt+1)} defines the op-
tions conditional on both individuals receiving job offers in t+ 1.
We represent recursively the program of the household in state nn as:
V nn(X) = max
ci,a′≥a,si∈{s,s}
2∑
i=1
u(ci, li) + β
[∫
′,λ′
φRV
R(X ′) + (1− φR)[p(s1, λ)(1− p(s2, λ))Qen(X ′)
+ p(s2, λ)(1− p(s1, λ))Qne(X ′) + Π2i=1p(si, λ)Qee(X ′) + (1−Π2i=1p(si, λ))V nn(X ′)]dpi′|dpiλ′|λ
]
subject to:
a′ = (1 + rλ,Γ)a−
2∑
i=1
ci, Γ′ = T (Γ, λ) and li = 1− κ(si).
The value function of a household that has one of its members employed (without loss of
generality the first one) and the other member non-employed is:
V en(X) = max
a′≥a,s2
2∑
i=1
u(ci, li) + β[
∫
′,λ′
φRV
R(X ′) + (1− φR)[p(s2, λ)(1− χ(λ))Qee(X ′)
+p(s2, λ)χ(λ)Qne(X ′) + (1− p(s2, λ))(1− χ(λ))Qen(X ′) + (1− p(s2, λ))χ(λ)V nn(X ′)]] dpi′|dpiλ′|λ
subject to:
a′ = (1 + rλ,Γ)a+ w(Γ,λ)h1 −
2∑
i=1
ci Γ′ = T (Γ, λ) and l1 = 1− h, l2 = 1− κ(s2),
where χ(λ) is the probability that the employed individual loses his job.
The value function of a household with two employed members is given by:
V ee(X) = max
a′≥a
∑
i
u(ci, li) + β[
∫
′,λ′
φRV
R(X ′) + (1− φR)[(1− χ(λ))2Qee(X ′)
+(1− χ(λ))χ(λ)(Qen(X ′) +Qne(X ′)) + χ(λ)2V nn(X ′)] dpi′|dpiλ′|λ))
subject to:
a′ = (1 + rλ,Γ)a+
2∑
i=1
(
w(Γ,λ)h
i − ci) Γ′ = T (Γ, λ) and li = 1− h.
Finally, the value function of a retired household is:
V R(X) = max
a′≥0
2∑
i=1
u(ci, li) + β[
∫
′,λ′
φAV
nn(X ′) + (1− φA)V R(X ′) dpi′|dpiλ′|λ));
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subject to:
a′ = (1 + rλ,Γ)a−
i∑
ci Γ′ = T (Γ, λ) and li = 1.
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium consists of a set of value functions V ij, i, j ∈ {e, n} and V R,
and a set of decision rules for consumption (ckij(X) and c
k
R(X)), asset holdings (a
′
ij(X)
and a′R(X)), search intensity (s
k
ij(X) ∈ {s, s}), and labor supply (hkij(X) ∈ {0, h}19) for
individual k ∈ {1, 2}. It also consists of a collection of quantities {Kt, Lt} and prices
{wt, rt} and a law of motion of the distribution Γ′ = T (Γ, λ) such that:
1. Given prices, households optimize and the optimal policies solve the Bellman equa-
tions defined previously.
2. Firms maximize profit
wt = K
α
t λt
1−αL−αt and rt = K
−α
t λt
1−αL1−αt − δ.
3. Markets clear
Yt + (1− δ)Kt = φ˜
∑
i,j
∫
(a′ij(X) +
∑
k=1,2
ckij(X))dΓ
ij
t + (1− φ˜)
∫
(a′R(X) + cR(X)) dΓ
R
t
Lt =
∑
i,j
∫ ∑
k=1,2
khI(hki,j(X) = h) dΓi,jt and Kt =
∫
A
a dΓt
where Γijt and Γ
R
t denote the conditional cdfs for households in states i, j ∈ {e, n}
and R respectively and φ˜ = φA
φR+φA
.
4. Individual behavior is consistent with aggregate behavior.
Let us define ωklij (X) as the probability (given X) of a transition from the joint state ij
to kl where i, j, k, l ∈ {e, n}. For example, ωeeee ≡ (1 − χ(λt))2 is the probability that
a household in ee in t, remains in ee at the beginning of t + 1. Analogously, ωeenn ≡
Πk=1,2p(s
k
nn(X), λt) is the probability that two non-employed household members receive
a job offer simultaneously. The law of motion of the measure Γ can be represented as
follows:
Γeet+1(A˜, E) = (1− φR)
∑
i,j∈{e,n}
(
∫
a′ij∈A˜,′∈E
I(h1ee(X) = h ∩ h2ee(X) = h)ωeei,j dpi′| dΓi,jt
where ωeeij for i, j ∈ {e, n} are the probabilities defined before,
Γent+1(A˜, E) = (1− φR)
∑
i,j∈{e,n}
∑
(kl)∈{ee,en}
∫
a′ij∈A˜,′∈E
I(h1kl(X) = h ∩ h2kl(X) = 0)ωklij dpi′|dΓijt ;
19hkij(X) reflects desired hours. For example, we have h
k
ij(X) = 0 if i = n and k = 1 (or j = n and
k = 2). However, we may also have that hkij(X) = 0 with i = e and k = 1, if agent 1 has an offer and
decides not to work.
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the law of motion of Γnet is similarly defined,
Γnnt+1(A˜, E) = (1− φR)
∑
i,j∈{e,n}
∑
k,l∈{e,n}
∫
a′ij∈A˜,′∈E
I(h1kl(X) = 0 ∩ h2kl(X) = 0)ωklij (X)dpi′|dΓijt
+φA
∫
a′R(X)∈A˜,′∈E
dpi′|dΓRt ,
and finally
ΓRt+1(A˜, E) = φR
∑
i,j∈{e,n}
∫
a′i,j∈A,′∈E
dpi′|dΓ
i,j
t + (1− φA)
∫
a′R∈A˜,′∈E
dpi′|dΓRt ,
where A˜ ⊂ A and E ⊂ {11, 12, ..., 1n} × {21, 22, ..., 2n} are subsets of the relevant state
space. I(x) is an indicator function which takes the value 1 if statement x is true and 0
otherwise.
3.4 Bachelor Agents and Complete Markets
Our model brings together several approaches of the heterogeneous agents literature and
extends them through modeling a couple household. When we set p(s, λt) = p(s, λt) < 1
we have a model where individuals are either employed or unemployed and where the
relative fractions vary over the cycle. If we further eliminate idiosyncratic productivity
() risks, the framework considered is essentially that of Krusell and Smith (1998). When
the frictions are removed, so p(s, λt) = p(s, λt) = 1, we end up with the framework of
Chang and Kim (2006, 2007). Krusell et al. (2011, 2012) utilize a model similar to ours,
however, they assume bachelor households, and leave costly search outside their model.
As discussed previously, in order to better highlight our model’s properties, we will
contrast it with the two workhorse macro-models: the bachelor households model of
incomplete markets and the complete markets framework.
In the case of the bachelor households model optimal choices are found through the
following value functions.
V eB(X) = max
a′≥0
u(c, 1− h) + β
[∫
′,λ′
φRV
R
B (X
′) + (1− φR) [(1− χ(λ))QeB(X ′) + χ(λ)V nB (X ′)] dpi′|dpiλ′|λ
]
subject to a′ = (1 + r(Γ,λ))a+ w(Γ,λ)h− c and Γ′ = T (Γ, λ),
V nB (X) = max
a′≥0,s∈{s,s}
u(c, 1− κ(s)) + β
[∫
′,λ′
φRV
R
B (X
′)
+(1− φR)[p(s, λ)QeS(X ′) + (1− p(s, λ))V nB (X)]dpi′|dpiλ′|λ
]
subject to a′ = (1 + rΓ,λ)a− c and Γ′ = T (Γ, λ),
V RB (X) = max
a′≥0
u(c, 1) + β
[∫
′,λ′
(1− φA)V RB (X ′) + φAV nB (X)dpi′|dpiλ′|λ
]
subject to a′ = (1 + rΓ,λ)a− c and Γ′ = T (Γ, λ),
where now  denotes the level of idiosyncratic productivity of the agent, X ≡ {a, ,Γ, λ},
c and l denote, as usual, consumption and leisure in the household.
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In the case of the complete market model all individuals in the economy are part of
one family. Idiosyncratic risks are completely eliminated and individual wealth becomes
irrelevant (only aggregate wealth matters). As is well known, the optimal allocation in
this case is the solution to a planning program. Since it is well known, we state this
program formally in the online appendix.
4 Calibration
4.1 Preferences and Technology
In this section we describe the choice of parameters and functional forms. For the within
period utility function, we follow the empirical evidence provided by Attanasio and
Weber (1995) and Meghir and Weber (1996) and assume that consumption and hours
are complements in utility. Therefore, we choose the following functional form:
u(ci, li) =
((ci)η(li)1−η)1−γ − 1
1− γ
We set γ = 2 as our benchmark. Later on, we will show that our results also hold for
alternative specifications. Given γ we choose the value of η equal to 0.44 in order to
target an employment population ratio of 62% (the CPS average for the years 1994 to
2014) in the deterministic steady state. These choices give us a value for the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (1− η(1− γ))−1 equal to 0.69.
Given that the model’s horizon is one month we fix the depreciation rate δ to 0.0083,
this corresponds to a quarterly analogue of 2.5%. We set the capital share in final output α
to 0.33 and we assume that employed individuals spend a third of their time endowment in
market work; hence, we set h = 1
3
. We choose the value for the time preference parameter
β equal to 0.9916 so that the steady state interest rate r is 0.0041. This corresponds to
an annual analogue of 5%. For the aggregate TFP process λt, we follow Chang and Kim
(2006, 2007) and calibrate it so that the quarterly first order autocorrelation is ρλ = 0.95
and the conditional standard deviation is σλ = 0.007. We convert these numbers to their
monthly analogues and use the technique of Adda and Cooper (2003) to discretize the
process into a four state Markov chain.
4.2 Idiosyncratic productivity
The idiosyncratic labor productivity process is parameterized as follows: First, we use
the standard AR(1) specification (see for example Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante,
2009)
(3) log(it) = ρ log(
i
t−1) + v
i
,t
with innovations vi,t ∼ N (0, σ), i = 1, 2. To calibrate ρ and σ we need to find
estimates from the literature which account explicitly for selection effects: Since in the
model individuals will quit their jobs in response to a low realization of vi,t, it is obvious
that focusing only on a group of continuously employed individuals will give us biased
estimates. Chang and Kim (2006) have utilized the PSID data to estimate (3) removing
21
the influence of selection effects. They obtain ρ = 0.781 and σ = 0.331.
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One important parameter in the calibration of the model, is the correlation of shocks
inside the household. First, a stronger correlation gives a stronger AWE, since in response
to an unemployment shock of, say, agent 1 the insurance value of the labor supply of agent
2 is greater if 2 is close to 1. Second, since agents in the model are ex ante identical,
a correlation coefficient below unity gives us a gap in household member productivities.
This implies that each household has a primary and a secondary earner. We set the
correlation coefficient equal to 0.3 following the empirical evidence presented in Hyslop
(2001).21
4.3 Retirement
In the CPS the monthly probability that an individual becomes retired is 0.0095. We
therefore set φR equal to this number. We further choose the value of φA = 0.0507 to
match the fraction of the US population which is retired (15.78% in the CPS).22
4.4 Search Technology and Separations
4.4.1 Search frictions
Let λs be the steady state of TFP. We set p(s, λs) = 0.26, p(s, λs) = 0.16 and χ(λs) = 0.02.
These choices are explained through the following considerations: First, the average UE
rate in the CPS data is equal to 0.25. As we shall see, the equilibrium of the model will
give us a selection of productive individuals into unemployment; these individuals will
almost always accept job offers. To match the UE rate as in the data we need to assume
a tight friction.
Second, out of the labor force individuals will be relatively unproductive; they will
reject offers with a large probability. Over a wide range of values for p(s, λs) the OE rate
does not change significantly, and the model produces a value close to the data counter-
part. To determine the appropriate value we compute the transition rate to employment of
the “non-searchers”. In the data the non-searchers have a monthly transition probability
to employment equal to 14.5%. We set p(s, λs) equal to 0.16 so as to match this moment.
In Section 7 we will report results from alternative calibrations of this parameter.
Finally, an exogenous separation rate of 2% is good compromise between matching
the EU rate and the EO rate.
20These parameter values derive from a sample of household heads. For married women they estimate
ρ = 0.724 and σ = 0.341. Because these values are close and also because our model assumes that
individuals are ex ante identical, we use the estimates for the male population. Later on, we will show
that our results are robust towards different values for these parameters.
21The value of 0.3 applies to the raw data of Hyslop’s PSID sample. He then estimates that the
intra-household correlation of fixed effects is 0.5 and the correlation of temporary shocks is 0.15. Since
the  process summarizes both of these random variables it is preferable to use the average correlation
coefficient.
22The model’s life cycle structure is simplistic, this explains why individuals live on average too few
years in retirement. Had we adopted a less parsimonious life cycle structure and included population
growth, we could capture the survival hazard in retirement. Notice however that since retirement is short,
the fact that pensions are left outside the model is not crucial. Individuals are not going to save too
much to ward off the retirement risk. In the online appendix we establish this by solving the model with
retirement income. Our results do not change significantly.
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4.4.2 Cost of Search
As discussed earlier, si may take two values, s and s. Individuals who are out of the labor
force choose s as the optimal search level. Without loss of generality, we normalize this
level to zero. Moreover, we set s > 0.23
The cost of search κ(si) equals zero when si = s and it equals κ > 0 when si = s.
We set κ equal to 0.23 to match an unemployment rate of 6.2% in the steady state. This
implies that unemployed individuals spend roughly thirty percent less of their time in
the market, than employed individuals do. This value may seem high, since we have
interpreted search costs as time costs.24 Note that in the data, individuals who are out of
the labor force maybe retired (a fraction 46.6% of the total), disabled (15%), attending
high school or college (13.6%) or they maybe out of the labor force for “family reasons”
(16.8%). Since our model misses some of these margins, it requires a large cost of search
to generate an unemployment rate that is consistent with the data.
4.4.3 Changes in frictions over the cycle
In the model with aggregate fluctuations, both, the arrival rates of job offers and the
separation probabilities change with the aggregate state. To calibrate the parameters our
approach is the following: First, as in the steady version of the model, in the economy
with aggregate uncertainty the UE rate tracks closely p(s, λt). To calibrate p(s, λt) we
take the job finding probability from the data, and compute the average between the
largest positive, and the (absolute of the) largest negative percentage deviations from the
mean: ξp ≡ (max(UEt)−min(UEt))2 mean(UE) . We find that ξp = 0.37 in the data. We then set the
highest value of the job finding rate in the model equal to (1 + ξp) p(s, λt) and the lowest
value equal to (1 − ξp) p(s, λt). The remaining values are uniformly distributed in this
interval.
Second, we assume that the arrival rate of job offers to O agents behaves in exactly
the same way as the one for the unemployed. Therefore, the highest arrival rate for O
agents is (1 + ξp)p(s, λs) and the lowest is (1− ξp)p(s, λs).25
For separation shocks we apply the same procedure. From the UE rate series in the
data we compute ξχ = 0.28. Therefore, χ(λt) varies from (1 − ξχ)χ(λs) to (1 + ξχ)χ(λs)
over the cycle.
23In the US data, out of the labor force individuals do not exert almost any search effort. For example,
the CPS data set records the search methods that individuals utilize to look for jobs. The number of
methods can be thought as a proxy for search intensity (see Shimer, 2004). The average number of search
methods utilized by O agents is equal to 0.004, very close to zero. The average number of methods for
unemployed workers is 1.90. Notice, however, that s and s are simply normalizations. What matters for
allocations are the search cost κ(s) and the frictions p(s, λ).
24It is well known (see for example Mukoyama et al., 2014), that individuals do not spend a lot of
time searching for job opportunities. However, if we assume that looking for a job entails a complete
re-organization of a person’s life (e.g. giving up on home production and so on) assuming high search
costs is reasonable. This argument follows Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005).
25This choice is consistent with many papers which assume different levels of search effort. For example,
in models with on the job search, it is typically assumed employed and unemployed workers receive
offers from the same matching function and at proportional rates. The proportionality parameter is their
relative search intensities (see for example Barlevy, 2002). Analogously, we could write p(s, λt) =
s
sp(s, λt)
and re-normalize ss =
0.16
0.26 . This ratio will remain constant over the cycle.
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Note that this structure gives an advantage to the model to match the cyclical prop-
erties of the flows between employment and unemployment. However, it does not give
any advantage to match the transitions between in and out of the labor force. These are
determined endogenously through the labor supply of individuals. These moments will
be used to evaluate the performance of the model.
4.5 Calibration Targets
The baseline values for the bachelors and complete markets models have been chosen
applying the calibration procedure described in the previous subsections. In Table 7 we
summarize these choices. The table is split in four parts. Parts A-C report parameter
values (technology endowments and frictions) which are common across models. Part D
shows parameters (preferences) which differ across models. We have determined these
as follows: First, for all of the models we assume the same value of γ. Second, for each
model we pick the weight of consumption in utility η, the search cost κ and the discount
rate β to hit the employment population, unemployment rate and interest rate targets
discussed previously.
Under incomplete financial markets, households work and save more to self-insure
against the idiosyncratic risks they face. Therefore, to achieve the employment and in-
terest rate target, the model with bachelor households requires a low β and a low η. The
values of η and β increase as we move closer to complete markets.
5 Steady State Analysis
Before presenting the analysis of aggregate fluctuations we provide information on the
model’s performance in the steady state. This is useful to understand the working of
the model. Its properties will be essential to understand the cyclical behavior we will
document subsequently.
5.1 Policy functions
We first illustrate theoretically how the model generates transitions across labor market
states. In Figure 1 we show the policy functions hijk (i, j ∈ {e, n}, k = 1, 2) for a generic
value of . Without loss of generality we assume that 1 > 2, i.e. individual 1 is more
productive than individual 2. The policy rules vary as we vary . For now we take
productivity fixed. Later on we show what happens when productivity changes. The
figure consists of three panels. Panel A shows the policy functions in the case where both
household members have job offers, panel B when only the first member has a job offer
and panel C when no one has an offer.26
The asset grid in Panel A is divided into 3 ’regions’. In ’Region 1’ the household is
relatively poor and therefore finds it optimal to set heek = h for k = 1, 2 so that both
individuals work. Subsequently, the household is somewhat richer in ’Region 2’ ´and
26We will later study the labor supply behavior of the couple where agent 2 is employed and agent
1 is not employed. For the sake of brevity we have omitted this case from the figure, the decisions are
similar to those portrayed in the second line in figure 1, but the relevant thresholds are shifted to reflect
the different productivity levels of agents 1 and 2.
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Table 7: The Model Parameters (Monthly Values)
Parameter Symbol Value Target
A: Technology and endowments
Standard Dev. TFP σλ .0041
US DATA
AR(1) of TFP shock ρλ 0.983
Share of Capital α 0.33
Depreciation Rate δ .0083
Time Working h 1
3
Normalization
AR(1) of idiosyncratic productivity ρ 0.98 CK (2006)
Standard Dev. of idiosyncratic productivity σ 0.11 CK (2006)
Correlation (1, 2) ρ˜(1,2) 0.3 AWE
B: Retirement
Retirement Rate φR .00945 CPS data
Reentry Rate φA 0.0507 US Retired Population
C: Search frictions
Offer Rate: O p(s, λs) 0.16
Worker FlowsOffer Rate: U p(s, λs) 0.26
Exogenous Separation Rate χ(λ) .02
Fluctuations in p(s, λ) ξp 0.37 CPS DATA
Fluctuations in χ(λ) ξχ 0.28
D: Model specific parameters
Parameter Symbol Couples Bachelors Com. Markets Target
γ 2 2 2 AW & MW
Consumption Weight η 0.44 0.41 0.50 E-pop = 0.62
Cost of Search κ 0.233 0.2500 0.256 Urate =0.062
Discount Factor β 0.9916 0.9905 0.9959 Equilibrium r
Note: The table summarizes the values of the model parameters under the baseline calibration.
Panels A-C of the table show the specification of the technology and the endowments which is
common across models (couples, bachelors and complete markets). Panel D of the table shows
preferences parameters which differ across models. These parameters are calibrated so that
the model replicates the observed employment population ratio, the unemployment rate and
the interest rate, respectively. The last column in the table list for each variable the target
discussed in text. AW & MW are Attanasio and Weber (1995) and Meghir and Weber (1996).
As explained in the text we followed the empirical evidence of these papers and assumed that
utility is non-separable between consumption and leisure. The value γ = 2 is our benchmark
calibration.
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Figure 1: Labor Supply Policy Function
Job Hoarding Agent 2
Job Hoarding Agent 1
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S = (E,E)
Region 2
S = (E,O)
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S = (U,U)
Region 7
S = (U,O)
Region 8
S = (O,O)
assetsA: (e,e)
B: (e,n)
C: (n,n)
assets
assets
Note: The Figure plots the labor supply rule for couples, given productivity  and over the
wealth grid. S denotes the joint labor market status of family members. Panel shows the case
where both family members have job offers, panel B where only agent 1 has an offer, and panel
C where none of them has an offer.
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therefore sets hee1 = h and h
ee
2 = 0. In this case, agent 1 works and agent 2 flows to out of
the labor force. In ’Region 3’ the household is even richer and therefore withdraws both
household members from the labor market. When both agents have an offer, labor market
frictions are essentially irrelevant, the joint employment status is determined through a
choice of hours. When the family accumulates assets its members quit employment and
at the same time they quit the labor force altogether. This represents a standard wealth
effect on labor supply. In response to changes in wealth the model predicts flows from E
to O and not from E to U .
5.1.1 Job Hoarding
’Region 4’ in panel B shows that when agent 1 has a job, agent 2 is unemployed if wealth
is low enough. However, in ’Region 5’, as wealth increases the couple prefers to send agent
2 to out of the labor force rather than to send her to unemployment.
We also see the following: ’Region 4’ in panel B does not fully overlap with ’Region 1’
in panel A. Thus, if initially both are employed and household wealth is not too low, and
an exogenous separation shock arrives, then agent 2 does not become unemployed but
quits the labor force altogether. This is an important property of the model, which was
first discussed by Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005). Because of the presence of search costs
individuals exert a sort of job hoarding behavior: they want to hold on to their jobs, and
wait for an exogenous separation shock to drop out of the labor force. The area where
this effect is present is bracketed by the blue rectangular.
Panel C shows the case where both household members are non-employed. Again,
wealth effects explain the search behavior of the couple. At low wealth levels (’Region
6’) both individuals search for jobs. At somewhat higher levels, the couple keeps only
its most productive member in unemployment (’Region 7’). At even higher levels it
withdraws both members from the labor force (’Region 8’). The cut-off wealth levels
show that there is another part of the state space where job hoarding occurs. This time
it is agent 1 who drops to O when the separation shock arrives. Job hoarding for agent 1
is represented by the red rectangular.
Job hoarding is an important feature of all incomplete market models we will study in
this paper. It is also present in the case of bachelor households. A substantial part of the
flows from E to O will result from separation shocks hitting relatively wealthy employed
individuals.
5.1.2 Productivity Shifts
So far, we have held productivity constant. Suppose now that there is a drop in 1 but
that 1 > 2 still holds. This movement in productivity has an intertemporal substitution
effect which decreases the desired labor supply for agent 1. As a consequence, ’Regions’
2, 5 and 7 now become smaller, their upper bounds will shift to the left. At the same
time, for agent 2, the movement in productivity has a pure wealth effect, her desired labor
supply may increase. This may extend ’Regions’ 1, 4 and 6 to the right. On the one hand,
the productivity shock may induce agent 1 to drop out of the labor force, if household
wealth is sufficiently high (e.g. ’Region 5’). On the other, the shock may induce agent 2
to join the labor force if wealth is sufficiently low.
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5.2 Wealth and Employment Distributions
5.2.1 The Wealth Distribution
Figure 2 shows the steady state wealth distribution where the horizontal axis shows wealth
levels in thousands of US dollars. The graph plots the distribution of wealth for the entire
population, as well as separately by the employment status of the household’s members
and for retired individuals.
Figure 2: Wealth Distribution - Couples Model
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Note: The graph shows the long run steady state distribution of assets in the benchmark model
with couple households. The dotted line corresponds to all households in the economy. The solid
line shows the case of households with two employed members, the dashed line one employed
member, the cross line households with both members not employed and the dashed dotted line
retired households. The horizontal axis shows wealth (in thousands of US dollars of 2014) the
vertical axis shows the fractions of households holding a particular wealth level.
The model does not match the level of wealth dispersion we see in the data. In
particular, it cannot replicate the thick right tale of the US wealth distribution, it does
not give a substantial fraction of the population with a wealth level of several millions of
dollars (see for example Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006). This is not surprising. It is well
known, that models of heterogeneous infinitely lived agents, which rely only on uncertainty
in the labor market to generate unequal wealth distributions, cannot match the US data.27
27Our life cycle structure is too simplistic for the model to generate wealth dispersion similar to standard
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Figure 3 shows the wealth distributions from the couples model and the bachelors
model. Couples save more than bachelors do. However, they do not save twice as much.
To show this clearly in the dash-dotted line of the graph we scaled up the wealth level of
bachelors by a factor of 2. This distribution would obtain in the couples model if three
conditions are met: i) If 1t = 
2
t ∀t, in other words if productivity shocks are perfectly
correlated, ii) if the arrivals of offers and exogenous separations are perfectly correlated
events (in our calibration they are independent) and iii) if the choice of hours available
to couples becomes irrelevant for savings.
The fact that conditions i) to iii) are not satisfied means that the incentive of couple
households to accumulate assets to buffer shocks in labor income is weakened, relative to
the model with bachelor households. This holds in spite of the differences in the discount
factors across the two models.
5.2.2 Employment Distributions
We now explain how the endogenous wealth distribution produced by the model interacts
with the labor supply decisions of households to determine wealth-employment distribu-
tions. In Figures 4 and 5 we merge the asset distributions with the employment decision
rules studied previously. Each of the four panels in the figures corresponds to a differ-
ent joint labor market status. The top left panel shows the case where both household
members have a job offer. The top right, the case where the primary earner (agent 1)
has an offer. In the bottom left panel the secondary earner has an offer (and the primary
earner is not employed) and finally, the bottom right panel corresponds to the case where
both household members are not employed. The shaded areas in the graphs correspond
to (some of) the ’Regions’ identified previously. To facilitate the exposition the optimal
decision rule S = (i, j) (where i, j ∈ {E,U,O}) is shown separately for each part of the
state space.
Consider first Figure 4. The shaded area in the top left panel shows the range of
wealth over which the couple keeps the primary earner employed, the secondary earner
drops to out of the labor force. Clearly, the endogenous asset distribution has zero mass
at any wealth level within this range (above point A). Where the mass is positive (i.e.
the non-shaded area) the couple wants to keep both individuals working. Notice that this
decision rule impacts the shape of the distribution in the top right panel: A substantial
mass of households is concentrated at point A.
In the bottom left panel we assume agent 1 is not employed and agent 2 is. Given
that agent 1 is the primary earner the most likely reason for this state is that she got
hit by a χ shock and lost her job. Because χ shocks arrive at a low rate (2%), the mass
of agents in the distribution is quite small. Roughly 20 times as many households have
life cycle economies (for example Huggett, 1996). Therefore, the performance of the model in matching
the wealth distribution is comparable to infinite horizon models. All of the incomplete market models
we will consider in this paper yield a GINI coefficient of around 0.5, far below the value of 0.8 observed
in the US economy. However, we are not too concerned by this property. Standard ways to generate
realistic levels of inequality are to adjust the income process directly to capture top coded earnings (e.g.
Castaneda et al., 2003) or to introduce entrepreneurs and financial frictions (e.g. Cagetti and De Nardi,
2006). Both of these mechanisms are powerful, but it would be surprising if they had much to add to the
labor market participation margin, keeping in mind that there are only a few very wealthy households
and top coded earners in the US economy.
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Figure 3: Wealth Distributions - Couples vs Bachelors Economies
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
x 10−3
Wealth−Thousands of US Dollars
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
Couples
Singles
Singles*2
Note: The graph shows the long run steady state distribution of assets in the benchmark model
with couple households, and the bachelor households incomplete market model. The horizontal
axis shows wealth (in thousands of US dollars of 2014) the vertical axis shows the fractions of the
households holding a particular wealth level. The red (dash-dotted) line shows the hypothetical
distribution when wealth of each individual in the bachelors model was doubled.
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Figure 4: The Wealth Distribution and Employment Decision Rules (1)
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Note: The graph shows the distributions of assets conditional on idiosyncratic productivity
and labor market status. The top left panel illustrates the distributions in the case where both
household members have a job offer. The top right (bottom left) panel assumes that the primary
(secondary) earner is employed, the secondary (primary) earner is not employed. The bottom
right panel corresponds to the case where both household members are not employed. The
shaded areas in the graphs highlight decision rules over the labor market status (see main text
for details).
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Figure 5: The Wealth Distribution and Employment Decision Rules (2)
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Note: The graph shows the distributions of assets conditional on idiosyncratic productivity
and labor market status. Compared to 4, agent 1 here is less produtive but productivity of
agent is unchanged. The top left panel illustrates the distributions in the case where both
household members have a job offer. The top right (bottom left) panel assumes that the primary
(secondary) earner is employed, the secondary (primary) earner is not employed. The bottom
right panel corresponds to the case where both household members are not employed. The
shaded areas in the graphs show the decision rules over labor market status (see main text for
details).
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their primary earners employed (e.g. top right panel), as households that have their their
secondary earners employed. Two parts of the state space are highlighted in the figure.
The shaded area corresponds to an optimal status S = (U,E) (i.e. agent 1 is unemployed,
agent 2 is employed). The non shaded area corresponds to S = (O,E).
Figure 5 shows the decision rules and the wealth distributions assuming different
endowments . We increased the relative productivity of agent 2, but kept agent 1 as the
primary earner. We now see that over the entire wealth range the household wishes to
keep both of its members employed (e.g. S = (E,E) in the top left panel).28
Let us use these figures to illustrate the job hoarding property discussed previously.
Consider first the top right panel in Figure 4. Suppose that the household’s wealth exceeds
point B (roughly 350 thousand dollars). As the optimal rules S illustrate, the primary
earner remains employed, but she will withdraw from the labor force if a separation shock
arrives (bottom right panel). This situation shows job hoarding by agent 1. Agent 2 may
also exert job hoarding behavior. To see this, consider a household in Figure 5 which has
both members employed, and suddenly agent 2 gets hit by a χ shock. As can be seen
from the top panels, if household wealth exceeds point C (roughly 65 thousand dollars)
then agent 2 will move directly to out of the labor force.
Finally, to understand the effects of a change in productivity, assume that the house-
hold initially has both of its members employed and the productivity endowments are the
ones which correspond to Figure 5. Suppose that wealth is initially above point A and
assume that the household experiences a change in , the new draw is the one used to
construct Figure 4. We will then see agent 2 dropping to out of the labor force.
From Figures 4 and 5 we draw the following conclusions: i) the model will endogenously
give us agents who exert job hoarding behavior, these agents will flow from employment
to out of the labor force (due to exogenous separation shocks). ii) the model will give
a fraction of (secondary earners) which are out of the labor force because they have low
productivity.
5.2.3 Out of the Labor Force: Model vs Data
In steady state the total fraction of the population which is out of the labor force is 34%.
Out of these 15.78% are retired (this fraction is explicitly targeted) 15.5% are secondary
earners (not retired) and 4.2% are primary earners. Moreover, the model gives that 9%
of the population, is out of the labor force due to job hoarding.
To compare these numbers to the data, we first need to identify which group of in-
dividuals is the empirical counterpart for the agents who exert job hoarding behavior.
A (reasonably) good approximation is the non-searchers. As discussed previously, these
individuals do not want to pay the search costs, and therefore they are not unemployed.
Moreover, we can think of “non searchers” as (relatively) productive individuals, who
move to employment at a relatively high rate. This is consistent with the data observa-
tions described in the previous sections. Non-searchers represent 2% of the US population.
Therefore, the model overpredicts the number of non-searchers. In Section 6 we will in-
troduce changes to the model’s structure to reduce this number.
28The positive correlation between 1 and 2, means that when the productivity of agent 2 increases,
agent 1 expects her productivity to increase in the future. This explains why it is now never optimal for
agent 1 to drop to out of the labor force in the figure.
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When we look at the relative out of the labor force populations of primary and sec-
ondary earners in the data we find that not retired out of the labor force men represent
2.9% of the total population, and married women represent 11.2%.29 These numbers are
close to the model’s predictions. In spite of its simplistic structure the model can match
these moments very well.
5.2.4 Within Family Distribution of Labor Market Status
We now evaluate the model’s performance in matching the joint distribution of employ-
ment status within the family. In Table 8 we show fractions of households in terms of
the joint status. 46.5% of households have both of their members employed, 26.5% have
one employed member and one out of the labor force and 5.7% one employed and one
unemployed member. In the data these numbers are: 51.0% of couples are in state (E,E),
27% in the (E,O) state and 3.5% in state (E,U). In the model there are 0.5% (U,U)
couples, the analogous fraction in the data is 0.25%.
Table 8: Joint Labor Market Status
S (E,E) (E,O) (E,U) (U,U) (U,O) (U,U) E-pop
Model 0.465 0.253 0.057 0.005 0.017 0.205 0.620
Data 0.510 0.273 0.035 0.003 0.010 0.170 0.664
Note: The table shows the distribution of the joint labor market status of household members in
the model and the data. The data statistic refers to married couples in the US, it is constructed
from the CPS survey and corresponds to the years 1994-2014. S = (i, j) denotes the joint status
where i, j ∈ {E,U,O}. The last column shows the employment population ratio in the model
and the one of married couples in the data.
Note that even though we have assumed that household members have identical prefer-
ences and therefore, the distinction between primary and secondary earners is solely based
on productivity, the fit provided by the model in terms of these moments is remarkably
good.30
29If we consider household heads (see section 2) we find that 3.7% are out of the labor force and not-
retired. Note also that the model predicts more non-searchers among secondary earners. In particular,
there are twice as many non-searchers in the group of secondary earners. In the data there are three
times as many secondary earners who are non-searchers as there are primary earners.
30There is a discrepancy between our calibration target of 62% for the employment population ratio,
and the one reported in the last column of Table 8. Our calibration is based on the entire population of
ages 16 and above, whereas in the table we report moments for married individuals.
An alternative way to map the data to the couple households model is the following: Assume that
the economy consists of one household with 3 members: the husband, the wife and the child (whose age
is greater than 16). Assume that the husband is employed, the wife and the child are out of the labor
force. Denote this by S = (E,O,O). Based on the entire population the participation rate is equal to
33%. However, if we focus only on the married couple, we get a 50% participation rate. One way to
deal with this problem is to break down the family into combinations: 3 households two of which have
S = (E,O) and one household with S = (O,O). Then, we get a participation rate in the economy of 33%
(the right number) and a different division of labor market status within households. When we apply this
calculation to the CPS data we get that (E,E) families are roughly 44% of all households, and (E,O)
households are 33%. Therefore, our model is in-between these two ways of representing the data.
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Table 9: Steady State Flows in the Models
A: Couples B: Bachelors C: Complete Markets
To To To
From E U O E U O E U O
E 0.956 0.010 0.034 0.947 0.007 0.046 0.958 0.011 0.031
U 0.257 0.672 0.071 0.257 0.687 0.056 0.257 0.672 0.071
O 0.061 0.031 0.908 0.049 0.031 0.920 0.046 0.018 0.936
Note: The table shows average transition probabilities across labor market states from
the 3 models: Panel A shows the baseline with couple households, panel B shows
the model of bachelor households, and panel C shows the complete market model. E
represents employment, U unemployment and O out of the labor force.
5.3 Labor market flows
5.3.1 Flows in the Couples Model
In Table 9 we summarize the average worker flows. The left panel shows the flow rates
of the couples model. The data targets are the transition probabilities for all individuals
above age 16 that were shown in Table 3.
The model does a good job in matching the empirical worker flows. It matches near
perfectly the UE rate (since we chose the parameter p(s, λs) accordingly), and quite
accurately the EU rate (1% in the model and 1.34 % in the data). It also performs very
well in terms of the OE and the OU rates. It is however off targets in matching the UO
flow rate (7% vs 23% in the data). In light of our previous remarks, this failure of the
model is to be anticipated.
As discussed previously, to generate flows out of employment, the model possesses
two key mechanisms: the exogenous separation shocks (χ) and the changes in individual
productivity . Because  shocks are persistent, drops in productivity are infrequent, but
when they occur they often lead to a transition from E to O. χ shocks may lead either
to flows into unemployment or to flows to out of the labor force. This is clearly visible
from the table; the steady state (calibrated) value of χ is 2%, but the EU rate is 1%.
This suggests that half the times a χ shock hits, individuals flow to O. It is a direct
consequence of the job hoarding behavior we previously highlighted.
Bringing these findings together we can note the following important properties: First,
transitions between employment and unemployment are explained by the exogenous sep-
aration shocks and the frictions. Second, since the OE rate is much lower than 0.16 (the
calibrated value of p(s, λs)) and there are no frictions between states U and O, the flows
in and out of the labor force reflect changes in idiosyncratic productivity and household
wealth. Therefore the model, imparts a mechanism which is very similar to that of search
and matching models of the labor market (e.g. Pissarides (1984)) to generate transitions
between E and U , and a different mechanism, akin to the neoclassical labor supply ar-
guments (e.g. Chang and Kim (2006)) to explain flows in and out of the labor force.
Primary earners in the model are typically employed (or unemployed). As we have seen,
most of the out of the labor force individuals are secondary earners. Therefore, search
frictions are more important for primary earners than they are for secondary earners.
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5.3.2 Flow rates under Bachelors and Complete Markets
The difficulty of models of heterogeneous households to match the flow rate from employ-
ment to unemployment was first identified by Krusell et al. (2011). This difficulty derives
from two model properties: i) shocks are persistent and ii) wealth is run down during
unemployment and, as we have seen, poor agents are more likely to remain unemployed.
In the middle and left panels of Table 9 we offer a comparison between our model
and the other frameworks we consider: the bachelors model of incomplete markets and
the complete market model. This is an important comparison since, under bachelor
households we should expect the flow rates to be driven to a larger extent by household
wealth, under complete markets it is only the distribution of shocks to labor income which
influences the transitions. The couples model is in-between.
First, notice that the couples model can match better the flows from EU and from
EO than the bachelors model, which underpredicts the EU rate and overpredicts the EO
rate. In the case of complete markets, however, we obtain EU = 0.011 and EO = 0.031,
closer to the data targets. Second, note that the transition rate between U and O is
larger in the couples model than in the bachelors model by roughly 1.5 percentage points.
Under complete markets the UO rate is 7.1%, the same as in the couples model.
The relative importance of household wealth and idiosyncratic productivity can ex-
plain these patterns. Consider first the differences in terms of the EU and EO rates. Since
couple households want to keep their productive members in employment, it is more likely
that χ shocks lead to flows from employment to unemployment than from employment
to out of the labor force. This effect becomes even more powerful in the complete market
model. In contrast, in the bachelor households model, wealth becomes a more important
state variable, and as we have seen, agents accumulate more wealth than in the couples
model. In this case, χ shocks are more likely to lead to a large EO transition probability.
Now consider why the UO rate is larger in the couples model: As we have seen previ-
ously, a significant fraction of households are in state S = (E,U). For these households,
wealth is not necessarily run down during unemployment. Moreover, the productivity
shocks experienced by the employed household member, influence the labor supply of the
unemployed member. If for example, 1 increases it is very likely that agent 2 will flow
out of the labor force. In the bachelors model wealth is always decreased during unem-
ployment; and there is only one (persistent) shock which influences labor supply. Both
factors tend to make U a more persistent state.
Notice that the results shown in the table suggest that these different mechanisms
do not produce vastly different transition probabilities across the three models. Whether
we assume one, two or infinitely many agents in the household the flow rates are not
dramatically influenced because wealth and productivity are similarly persistent state
variables. As we will later see, though the steady state labor market flows are not that
far apart, the cyclical properties of the three models are strikingly different.
5.4 Added Worker Effect
5.4.1 Occurrence of the AWE in the model
We now explain how the model generates an AWE. To do so we briefly revisit the analysis
of section 5.2 (Figures 4 and 5). Consider first Figure 4 and assume that the household
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has its primary earner (agent 1) in employment, the secondary earner is not employed.
As the top panels show, in the case where household wealth exceeds point A, agent 2
remains out of the labor force even if she receives an offer. Assume now that agent 1
gets hit by a χ shock and loses his job. Independent of the labor market status of agent
2, agent 1 is unemployed (if wealth is also lower than point B in the graph). If agent 2
receives a job offer (which happens at rate p(s, λs)) there are two possibilities: i) wealth
is close to point A and ii) wealth is further than A. Note that if i) holds, then agent 2
will accept the offer. In the bottom left panel of the figure the decision rules tell us that
the optimal joint status is to set S = (U,E). This holds because the shaded region in the
bottom left panel defines a higher wealth threshold (around 120 thousand dollars) than
point A. Agent 2 will accept the offer only in the event where agent 1 loses his job; agent
2 will reject the offer otherwise (it is not optimal to set S = (E,E)). We therefore have
seen an AWE.
Notice that even though the region where the AWE occurs is small, the model places
endogenously a large fraction of households in that region. The reason for this is the saving
behavior of the couple. Point A represents the long run wealth level of the household given
 and assuming that agent 1 remains employed for many periods. In other words, A is the
so called buffer stock of savings. When this wealth level is reached the couple no longer
accumulates assets and agent 2 drops to O. The positive mass of households we see at
higher wealth levels, represents households that have experienced drops in idiosyncratic
productivity and had previously accumulated large stocks of assets. These households
will keep agent 1 employed and run down their wealth.
Figure 5 shows a different AWE. Suppose that a couple has wealth slightly larger than
point C in the top right panel. Now, suppose that agent 1 loses his job. Since point D
in the bottom right graph, represents a higher wealth level than point C in the top right,
there is a region where the transition from E to U experienced by agent 1, induces a
flow from O to U by agent 2. This AWE involves a transition into unemployment by the
secondary earner, rather than an immediate transition into employment as in the previous
example.
Finally, the model can give rise to dynamic AWEs. Since the household’s wealth is run
down when agent 1 loses his job, eventually the wealth stock can be low enough so that
agent 2 joins the labor force. This, for instance, is relevant for any wealth level initially
exceeding D in Figure 5.
5.4.2 AWE: Model vs. Data
We now compute the (dynamic) AWEs from the model and compare them to the previous
estimates from the US data. In Table 10 we show the coefficients ατ for τ = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2.
The data (model) moments are in Column 1 (2).
There are several noteworthy features: First, the model yields α−2 = α−1 = 0 since
the job destruction shocks are i.i.d and therefore not predictable. Second, the model
generates a contemporaneous value for the AWE equal to 4.7 percentage points, an effect
after one month (α+1) equal to 3.1% and an effect after two months equal to 3.4%. These
numbers are somewhat smaller than their data counterparts.
Notice that the coefficients ατ may be smaller in the model than in the data either
because the probability that the secondary earner joins the labor force (conditional on
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Table 10: Dynamic Added Worker Effect: Data and Model
ατ Entry Rates % of Households
τ Data Model Data Model Data Model
-2 1.9% 0 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4%
-1 3.2% 0 12.1% 11.4% 10.7% 10.0%
0 7.8% 4.7% 16. % 16.1% 13.0% 13.1%
+1 5.1% 3.1% 13.9% 14.2% 9.1% 9.8%
+2 3.9% 3.6% 12.8% 14.3% 3.2% 6.3%
Note: The Table shows the estimates of the AWE in the data (Column 1) and the
model (Column 2). Columns 3 and 4 show the entry rates into the labor force for
secondary earners (married women in the data) when primary earners (husbands)
become unemployed at τ = 0. Columns 5 and 6 show fractions of households who
benefit from the AWE (see text for further details).
the primary earner becoming unemployed) is lower than the data, or because the overall
(unconditional) probability that she joins is higher. In Columns 3 and 4 we document the
overall entry rates, conditional on spousal unemployment. Consider first the data column;
The first row shows the probability that a wife whose husband will become unemployed
in two months from now, joins the labor force. The entry rate is equal to 11.4% and
is roughly 2 percentage points larger than the unconditional entry rate (9.5%). In the
model (4th Column) the entry rate equals 11.4% but the coefficient α−2 is equal to 0%.
Therefore, the model overpredicts the unconditional probability. The same applies when
τ = −1.
Now consider the 3rd to the 5th rows in the table. We see that the entry rate for wives
in the data, is larger than the entry rate for secondary earners in the model when τ = 0.
The opposite holds for τ = 1 and τ = 2. In all cases, however, the differences are small;
the model matches quite accurately the rates we see in the data.
These points are crucial to show that the model matches very accurately the patterns
of insurance we documented in Section 2. Suppose that we increase the coefficients ατ to
match the data counterparts;31 then the entry rates will be larger than in the data and
consequently, a counterfactually large fraction of households will benefit from the AWE.
To make this point more transparent we list (in the last two columns of the table),
fractions of families which, across different horizons, benefit from the AWE. These num-
bers are based on simulating a population of families which at the beginning of period -2,
have their primary earners employed and the secondary earners out of the labor force. At
τ = 0 the primary earners become unemployed. We then calculate, across the different
horizons, the fractions of households in which the secondary earner joins the labor force.32
31This could be done (for instance) through raising the correlation coefficient of the productivity shocks.
32We set the entry rates at τ = −1 and τ = −2 equal to their unconditional means in the model.
Even though unemployment shocks are unanticipated, they are mitigated if both earners are in the labor
force. That is to say, if some families are lucky enough and the secondary earner has joined the labor
force before the arrival of the χ shock, we should also count them as families who benefit from insurance
through labor supply.
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The fractions drop with the horizon τ for two reasons: First, because when the sec-
ondary earner joins the household is dropped from the sample. Second, many unemploy-
ment spells suffered by primary earners are resolved by a transition back to employment.
In this case, the couple may move back to S = (E,O). If we add all the rows we obtain
the cumulative effect: The total fraction of households who benefit from joint search is
47.4% in the model, and 50.6% in the data. Therefore, the model matches this moment
very accurately.
6 Fluctuations in the Aggregate Labor Market
In this section we present the results from the business cycle analysis. Aggregate produc-
tivity and the job finding and separation probabilities fluctuate over time as described
previously. We trace the effects of economic fluctuations on the aggregate labor market.
6.1 Numerical Solutions to the models
To solve the incomplete market models with aggregate fluctuations we used value function
iteration applying the bounded rationality method outlined in Krusell and Smith (1998).
As them, we found that it is sufficient to approximate the distribution Γt using only
the first order moment, we do not need to introduce dispersion, skewness and so on to
approximate the law of motion of capital. This property of the model is due two features:
i) the savings schedules are (close to) linear in wealth ii) non-linearities near the borrowing
constraint do not matter much for aggregate behavior, since households in this part of
the state space hold very few assets anyway. Notice that these properties also hold in
the couples model, in spite of the fact that couples have more options over employment,
and do not accumulate as much wealth as bachelors do. As is well known, idiosyncratic
income shocks convexify the program (see for example Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo,
2001). The value functions both in the bachelors and the couples models are increasing
and concave in wealth and the policy rules feature the usual properties. We describe these
findings in detail in the online appendix.
To solve the complete market allocation, we used the simulations based Parameterized
Expectations Algorithm (PEA) of Den Haan and Marcet (1990)33. The PEA forms a
global approximation of the nonlinear first order conditions from the planning problem.
In the context of a model which features labor market frictions, the state variables which
need to be remembered for the solution are Kt, λt and the fraction of employed individuals
at every level of productivity t. The complete market allocation is therefore a large scale
problem. Note that previous work in the literature (for example Veracierto, 2008) has
resolved this problem using log-linear approximations. Our non-linear solution algorithm
is novel and should be of independent interest. The approach is outlined in the online
appendix.
33See also Faraglia, Marcet, Oikonomou, and Scott (2014).
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Table 11: Business Cycle Properties: Data and Models
Data Couples Bachelors Complete
ρx,Y
E-pop 0.81 0.87 0.91 0.93
U-rate -0.90 -0.93 -0.92 -0.95
LF 0.34 0.32 0.77 0.82
σx,Y
E-pop 0.86 0.72 0.93 1.04
U-rate 10.15 7.48 7.19 7.63
LF 0.27 0.29 0.54 0.56
Note: The table shows the business cycle properties of the aggregate labor market.
Column 3 shows the same data as Table 1 where also details about the data can be
found. Column 4 shows the corresponding result of the couple households model,
column 5 of the bachelor households model and column 6 of the complete market
model. All series are logged and HP filtered with smoothing parameter equal to 1600.
6.2 Cyclical Behavior of Employment, Unemployment and LF
participation
In Table 11 we show the cyclical behavior of the labor market statistics produced by the
models. We also repeat the data moments to facilitate the comparison. As the table
shows across all models employment is procyclical, and unemployment is countercyclical,
the contemporaneous correlation of these variables with GDP matches the data patterns
closely. The striking difference between the models however, is in the behavior of labor
force participation. We see that the bachelors model of incomplete markets generates a
very procyclical participation (a correlation coefficient of 0.77). The model of complete
markets gives us 0.82. The couples model with incomplete markets gives 0.32, very close
to the US data moment of 0.34.
Rows 4-6 of the table report the ratio of the standard deviations of employment,
unemployment and participation, relative to the standard deviation of aggregate output.
The following patterns emerge: First, the cyclical volatility of the labor force is close to
the data counterpart only under the couples model. We obtain a value of 0.29 very close
to the value of 0.27 we see in the data. In contrast, the models of bachelor households
and complete markets tend to overpredict the volatility of the labor force by about 100%;
we obtain 0.54 and 0.56, respectively.
All three models perform similarly in terms of the behavior of aggregate unemploy-
ment, in particular, they underpredict the cyclical volatility of the U-rate. However,
whereas the couples model also underpredicts the volatility of aggregate employment, the
bachelors and complete market models overpredict it. Because the differences in the be-
havior of unemployment are not substantial across models, the differences in the cyclical
volatilities of aggregate employment may only derive through differences in the behavior
of labor force participation. Under the bachelors and the complete market models, the
higher volatility in employment is driven by a counterfactually procyclical and volatile
entry into the labor force.
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6.2.1 Why is the labor force procyclical under bachelor households?
To explain these results we need to investigate how the different models generate transi-
tions over the business cycle through demonstrating the impact of the aggregate shocks
on the policy rules and the distributions of households across the state space. We begin
with the incomplete market models where these distributions are not trivial.
Figure 6: Responses of Employment and Participation to a TFP Shock
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Note: The graph shows the adjustment of aggregate employment and LF participation assuming
that TFP is equal to the highest possible level in periods -5 to -1 and in period 0 it drops to
the second lowest value. The top panel shows the adjustment of participation, the bottom of
the employment rate. The graphs are constructed from model simulations. In all cases we have
subtracted the first period value for the series as a normalization. Therefore, the responses
represent deviations from the initial value. The solid line corresponds to the couples model,
the dashed line to the bachelor households model and finally, the crossed line to the complete
market model.
In Figure 6 we show the response of the labor force participation (top panel) and
employment (bottom panel) to an aggregate shock which reduces TFP from the highest
possible level to the second lowest. The solid line represents the case of the couple house-
holds model, the dashed line shows the case of bachelors model. The graphs represent
model simulations. To better highlight the timing of the shock, we label period 0 the
period of the change in TFP and denote with negative (positive) integers the periods
before (after) the shock occurs. Moreover, from each series we have subtracted its initial
value. The responses shown are deviations from that value.
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There are several noteworthy features: First, when the shock hits, aggregate employ-
ment first rises, subsequently it drops below the initial condition and becomes procycli-
cal. Second, focusing on the bachelors model the labor force initially rises, subsequently
it drops again following the trail of the employment population ratio. Third, in the
couples model, the response of labor force participation is initially the same as it is for
employment, but after a few periods the labor force continues to rise, whereas employ-
ment drops.34 Therefore, in the couples model the labor force is countercyclical, in the
bachelors model it is procyclical.
What explains these patterns? It is easier to start with the model of bachelor house-
holds where the decisions concern one individual. In Figure 7 we show labor supply
decision rules and distributions borne out of this model. The top panels show the wealth
distributions for employed individuals, the bottom panels show the distributions and deci-
sion rules for non-employed individuals. To study the properties of the model we have split
the population in two parts i) workers of average productivity and ii) highly productive
workers.35
In the top left panel, the green shaded area shows the range of wealth over which a
worker with medium productivity drops to O when TFP is high. The vertical line and
the arrows in the graph denote how this range shifts when TFP drops. Hence, during
the boom, the wealth threshold above which the agent prefers to drop out of the labor
force is roughly 200 thousand dollars, in the recession it becomes roughly equal to 240
thousand dollars. For highly productive individuals (top right panel) there are no shaded
areas; this suggests that these agents never consider dropping out of the labor force.
The distributions shown in the graphs are as follows: With the blue-solid line we
denote the wealth distribution right before the aggregate shock occurs. This overlaps
strongly with the dashed green line, which shows the distribution in the period of the
shock. Finally, the red line traces the evolution of the distribution ten periods after the
shock.
First, notice that the change in the decision rule in the top left graph imparts a change
in the shape of the distribution at high wealth levels. In particular, it adds a mass of
agents who previously dropped out of the labor force, now they are willing to remain
employed. This explains why aggregate employment rises on impact when TFP drops.
Second, note that because the economy is in a recession and the separation shocks are
higher, the post shock distributions gradually shift downwards. This is more clearly visible
in the (+10 period) red curve. It explains why aggregate employment starts to fall a few
periods after the change in TFP.
In the bottom panels of the figure, the green shaded areas correspond to the range of
assets over which agents are out of the labor force. Note that for unproductive workers
(bottom left panel), the drop in TFP virtually has no impact on participation, but for
highly productive agents participation drops considerably in the recession. Bringing to-
gether the top right and bottom right panels we see that a mass of agents moves from in
the labor force to out of the labor force in the downturn (due to separation shocks and
the change in the threshold). This contributes to the procyclicality of participation we
34This pattern is consistent with the detrended US data. We do observe in some periods the labor
force moving opposite to aggregate employment.
35Workers of low productivity exert roughly the same behavior as i), in the interest of parsimony we
drop them from the graphs.
42
Figure 7: The Effects of a TFP Shock on the Wealth Distribution and Employment
Decision Rules in the Bachelors model
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Note: The graph shows the distributions of assets conditional on idiosyncratic productivity and
labor market status in the bachelors model. In the top panels agents have a job offers, whereas
in the bottom panels they don’t. The left panels show agents with mean productivity, whereas
the right panels show agents with high productivity. The distribution before the shock is shown
in blue, the distribution directly after the shock in green and the distribution ten periods after
the shock in red. The shaded areas in the graphs show when the agent drops out of the labor
force. The bold vertical lines and the arrows show how the thresholds change in response to the
TFP shock.
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see in the bachelors model.
The effects we document in this subsection are standard in macroeconomic models and
well known to the literature. The first intertemporal channel (that unproductive workers
want to hold on to their jobs) is driven by the tighter frictions during recessions, i.e. the
drop in p(st, λt) which makes jobs more valuable to workers (e.g. Garibaldi and Wasmer,
2005). The second channel, that (productive) workers prefer to pay the search costs in
economic expansions when the payoffs to labor market search are larger (equivalently
when the expected costs are lower) is a standard intertemporal substitution effect (e.g.
Veracierto, 2008). Under incomplete markets, it is only relevant for high earners, because
as we have seen, unproductive agents increase their search intensity only when they are
close to the borrowing limit. The intertemporal substitution effect is weakened in this
case.
The first channel is present in bachelor households model of Krusell et al. (2012). The
second is absent from that model because it is assumed that p(s, λt) = p(s, λt) and that
search costs are equal to zero.
6.2.2 Why is the labor force acyclical in the couples model?
Figures 8 and 9 summarize the behavior of couples and their responses to an aggregate
shock. Note that the figures show the same households we studied in Figures 4 and 5,
however, now we augment the graphs to include the effects of the cycle.
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Figure 8: The Effects of a TFP Shock on the Wealth Distribution and Employment
Decision Rules in the Couples Model (1)
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Note: The graph shows the distributions of assets conditional on idiosyncratic productivity and
labor market status. This figure shows the same households types (in terms of productivity) as
Figure 4. The top left panel illustrates the distributions in the case where both household mem-
bers have a job offer. The top right (bottom left) panel assumes that the primary (secondary)
earner is employed, the secondary (primary) earner is not employed. The bottom right panel
corresponds to the case where both household members are not employed. The shaded areas in
the graphs show the decision rules over labor market status. The distribution before the TFP
shock is shown in blue, the distribution directly after the shock in green and the distribution ten
periods after the shock in red. The bold vertical lines and the arrows show thresholds change
in response to the TFP shock.
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Figure 9: The Effects of a TFP Shock on the Wealth Distribution and Employment
Decision Rules in the Couples Model (2)
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Note: The graph shows the distributions of assets conditional on idiosyncratic productivity
and labor market status. The top left panel illustrates the distributions in the case where both
household members have a job offer. The top right (bottom left) panel assumes that the primary
(secondary) earner is employed, the secondary (primary) earner is not employed. The bottom
right panel corresponds to the case where both household members are not employed. The
shaded areas in the graphs show the decision rules over labor market status. The distribution
right before the TFP shocks arrives is shown in blue, the distribution directly after the shock
in green and the distribution ten periods after the shock in red. The bold vertical lines and the
arrows show the how thresholds change in response to the TFP shock.
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Let us use these graphs to explain the pattern of the labor force participation that we
previously documented. First, note that as in the case of bachelor households, couples
which have both of their members employed, desire to increase their labor supply in the
recession (top left panel in Figure 8). This contributes to the rise in aggregate employment
when the shock hits as we have previously seen. Second, the intertemporal substitution
effect which induces rich and productive agents to drop out of the labor force during
recessions is clearly visible in the bottom right panel; the vertical line indicates that the
wealth threshold at which agent 1 is indifferent between U and O has now moved further
to the left. If we put together these two factors we produce a response of participation
similar to the bachelors model.
Key to understand why participation is acyclical in the couples model is the behavior
of secondary earners. Consider a couple which before the recession had agent 1 employed
and agent 2 is out of the labor force. Moreover, assume that the wealth of this family is
between 90 and 140 thousand dollars. Further assume that in the recession the primary
earner loses his job; the couple then moves from the top right graph to the bottom right
graph. In this case agent 1 is unemployed and if agent 2 has not (in the meanwhile)
received a job offer, she is out of the labor force.
Now suppose that agent 1 remains unemployed for several periods. In spite of the fact
that the arrival rate of offers to O individuals is lower (in this example it has dropped
from 21.92 to 14.02 percent) there is still a significant probability that agent 2 will receive
an offer. Suppose this happens: then as the policy functions in the bottom left panel of
Figure 8 indicate, we will see agent 1 remain unemployed and agent 2 become employed.
The impact of this channel is clearly manifested in the graphs. Notice that the number of
couples who have their primary earner unemployed and their secondary earner employed,
dramatically increases in the recession and in particular it increases substantially for
households with wealth between 90 and 140 thousand dollars. This rise is explained by
the AWE. Moreover, we see a rise in the fraction of couples in state S = (E,E) (in the
green area in the top left panel). This is an immediate consequence of the precautionary
labor supply behavior. In the longer term however, the fraction of (E,E) may drop due
to the higher arrival rates of separation shocks during recessions.
Finally, note that the significance of the AWE for the behavior of participation in the
couples model can also be illustrated with the aid of Figure 9. In this case, due to the
higher separation shocks, individuals experience transitions into unemployment. Families
run down their wealth and react through bringing into the labor force their secondary
earners. This is clearly illustrated by the significant rise in the mass of households in state
S = (U,U), in the bottom right panel. The AWE is therefore important also in this case,
however, it is mostly dynamic.
6.2.3 Why is the labor force procyclical under complete markets?
We now turn to the case of the complete market economy. The response of the labor force
participation and employment in this model is depicted with the crossed line in Figure 6.
To explain the patterns we see in the figure note first that under complete markets
unemployment risks are not idiosyncratic, and therefore do not affect the behavior of
individuals. The behavior of the economy (given the state variables) is summarized in
the behavior of two thresholds: i) the productivity level below which agents flow from
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employment to out of the labor force and ii) the threshold above which an agent becomes
unemployed. Our findings are as follows: First, as in the case of the incomplete market
models, the planner reduces the outflow from E to O, keeping less productive individuals
employed in recessions. Second, the intertemporal substitution effect is powerful and the
unemployment threshold moves up in the recession. This generates a large outflow from
the labor force. These findings are similar to the findings of Veracierto (2008).
Thus, we have shown that the response of the labor market in the complete market
economy is very similar to the response in the bachelors model. This is an interesting
implication because as we have seen the crucial state variable in the case of incomplete
markets is household wealth, under the complete market allocation it is only idiosyncratic
productivity that matters. Apparently, the composition effects which derive from these
states, lead to similar properties in the aggregate labor market.
6.3 Primary and Secondary Earners over the Business Cycle
We now study the behavior of primary and secondary earners in the model and in the
data. In section 2 we saw that in the US data married women (secondary earners) have an
employment population ratio which is neither volatile nor procyclical. Their labor force
participation was found to be negatively correlated with GDP. These were the motivating
facts for our study.
In the model we have defined the agent with the higher productivity to be the pri-
mary earner. Since this is done every period and despite productivity being persistent,
the identity of the primary earner changes over time. Since in the data the identity of
husbands and wives does not shift we cannot compare the model withe the data based on
current productivity only. Therefore, we compute for each household member the average
productivity i ≡∑s is 1s+1 over a horizon s = 0, 1, 2, ..., TR, where TR denotes the date the
household retires.36 We then define as the primary earner the individual with the higher
average productivity. To see how this may impact the business cycle moments assume
that we see a household with s = 0. This household retires tomorrow, hence only current
productivity determines the identity of the primary earner. However, if a household never
retires then s → ∞ and the average productivity becomes equal across members since
both members are ex ante, and therefore also in the long run, identical. In the latter case,
the two household members are then simultaneously both, primary and secondary earners.
The corresponding business cycle moments are the ones for the aggregate labor market
in Table 11. Through averaging across households we obtain a definition of primary and
secondary earners which corresponds better to the data. However, we also ensure that we
do not exacerbate the differences in the business cycle moments.
The results are displayed in Table 12. The findings are as follows: First, the correlation
of the employment rate of secondary earners with GDP is 0.63 and the volatility ratio is
0.58. In the data these numbers are 0.45 and 0.57 respectively. Second, the correlation
of participation with GDP of secondary earners is -0.10 and the volatility ratio is 0.38
in the model. In the data we have -0.23 and 0.43 respectively. Finally, the model gives
36TR varies across households depending on the realizations of the retirement shock. Some households
retire after 1 period hence TR = 0, others retire after many periods and so on. We compute 
i based on
the realization we observe, we then average across households. See the online appendix for further details
on the computation.
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Table 12: Business Cycle Properties: Primary and Secondary Earners
Primary Earners Secondary Earners
E-pop U-rate LF E-pop U-rate LF
ρx,Y 0.95 -0.95 0.73 0.63 -0.92 -0.10
σx,Y 0.89 7.75 0.27 0.58 7.12 0.38
Note: The table shows the cyclical properties of employment, unemployment and
participation of primary and secondary earners in the baseline model. ρx,Y is the
contemporaneous correlation of variable x with GDP. σx,Y is the ratio of standard
deviations between x and Y . All series are logged and HP filtered with smoothing
parameter equal to 1600.
us 0.79 and 0.29 for the correlation and volatility of participation of primary earners.
The data counterparts are 0.12 and 0.21. Therefore, primary earners now have a more
procyclical and less volatile participation than secondary earners do, in line with the data
observations.37
Note that in spite of its simplicity the model matches the data patterns closely. In
the online appendix we show that the success of the model in matching the behavior of
primary and secondary earners does not hinge on the persistence of the  process. When
we assume higher values of ρ we obtain very similar results.
6.3.1 Joint Labor Market Status over the Cycle
In Table 13 we look at the business cycle moments of the fraction of couple households in
state S = (i, j) where i, j ∈ {E,U,O}. Each row in the table represents a different joint
labor market status. The columns show the correlation of the detrended series with GDP
and the relative standard deviations in the model and in the data.
The results in the table suggest that the model is able to capture quite accurately the
joint behavior of couples and in particular the correlations of the joint status of couples
with economic activity. For instance, the model predicts that the fraction of families
that have both family members employed is strongly procyclical and households in state
(E,U) are countercyclical. The fraction of families in state (E,O) is mildly procyclical;
its contemporaneous correlation with GDP is 0.40 in the model and 0.49 in the data. The
only correlation which is not captured well by the model is that for (O,O) households.
The model gives a value of -0.67, the analogous object in the data is -0.02. This can be
explained by the fact that these households are typically very wealthy.
These observations are important; they demonstrate that the economic mechanism
bestowed by the model on households produces aggregate properties for these fractions
which are close to the data. As we have seen the AWE leads to substantial changes in
the joint labor market status over the cycle. These changes are in line with the data
counterparts.
37The too high correlation predicted in the model (0.79 versus 0.12 in the data) comes from the fact
that the model generates too many wealthy households, whose primary earner is close to being indifferent
between participating or not. These households are more like bachelor households. Their participation
rate is very procyclical because of the intertemporal substitution effect we previously explained.
49
Table 13: Joint Labor Market Status: Cyclical Properties
Data Model
S ρx,Y
σx
σY
ρx,Y
σx
σY
(E,E) 0.72 1.06 0.83 1.36
(E,O) 0.49 1.12 0.40 1.03
(E,U) -0.90 11.75 -0.90 7.02
(U,U) -0.81 21.47 -0.97 10.46
(U,O) -0.88 12.66 -0.96 6.93
(O,O) -0.03 0.80 -0.67 0.37
Note: The table shows the contemporaneous correlation ρx,Y and the relative standard deviation
σx
σY
between the fraction of households in state S = ij where i, j ∈ {E,U,O} and aggregate
output. The data corresponds to married couples in the US in the period 1994-2014. Details
can be found in the online data appendix. The model is the baseline couples model. All series
are logged and HP filtered with smoothing parameter equal to 1600.
6.4 Cyclical Behavior of Flow Rates
In Table 14 we document the behavior of the flow rates in the models and in the data.
There are several noteworthy features: First, all the models predict that the flow rates UE
are very procyclical and the volatility is close to the data counterpart. This is obviously
not surprising, we had previously explained that flows from unemployment to employment
are governed by the frictions p(s, λ). Since these are calibrated to the data, the UE
rates predicted by the models match the data pattern. Second, all of the models give a
procyclical OE rate and a countercyclical OU rate (the correlation coefficients are close
to the data counterparts). This feature can also be explained by the movements in the
frictions. Since p(s, λ) increases in economic expansions individuals who are out of the
labor force and join the labor force are more likely to experience an immediate transition
into employment in booms than in recessions.
Third, notice that the models differ in terms of their performance in the EU rates and
in the EO rates. In terms of the EU rates the bachelors model performs worse, it predicts
a contemporaneous correlation with GDP of -0.48 (therefore mildly countercyclical). The
couples and the complete market models give -0.73 and -0.84 respectively, very close to
the data. Multi-member households have their most productive agents in employment.
During recessions, when jobs are destroyed at a larger rate, these agents drop to unem-
ployment since they are primary earners. In contrast, the bachelors model predicts that
household heads are relatively wealthy, they flow to out of the labor force when their jobs
are destroyed.
Notice that this argument can also explain why the flow rate from E to O is more
negatively correlated with economic activity in the bachelors model, than in the complete
market model (-0.35 vs. -0.27). However, it cannot explain why the couples model
performs better and produces a correlation coefficient of 0.03 and closer to the data
moment (0.43). The behavior of secondary earners is pivotal. As we have seen these
agents flow into the labor force to provide insurance, and a substantial part of these flows
result in employment. When the primary earner finds a job, the secondary earner may
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return to O if household wealth has not been significantly reduced. During recessions the
duration of unemployment is larger, and unemployment shocks deplete household wealth
at a faster pace than in expansions. Therefore, secondary earners become more attached
to their jobs.
Table 14: Flow Rates: Cyclical Properties
Data Couples Bachelors Complete
ρx,Y
σx
σY
ρx,Y
σx
σY
ρx,Y
σx
σY
ρx,Y
σx
σY
EU -0.83 6.41 -0.73 3.87 -0.48 3.22 -0.84 4.81
EO 0.49 2.62 0.03 2.60 -0.35 2.78 -0.27 1.89
UE 0.87 7.11 0.92 7.06 0.92 6.47 0.92 6.75
UO 0.74 4.18 -0.53 3.04 -0.29 3.41 -0.49 3.13
OE 0.62 3.30 0.75 2.70 0.71 2.87 0.76 4.46
OU -0.81 6.73 -0.84 3.91 -0.79 6.16 -0.74 3.86
Note: The table shows the contemporaneous correlation ρx,Y and the relative standard deviations
σx
σY
between labor market flows and de-trended GDP. Columns 2 and 3 report the US data
moments. Details on the data can be found in the online data appendix. Columns 4 and 5 show
the results of the baseline couples model. Columns 6 and 7 show the results of the bachelors
model while columns 8 and 9 show the results of the complete markets model. All series are
logged and HP filtered with smoothing parameter equal to 1600.
This observation is consistent with our previous finding that the employment popula-
tion ratio of secondary earners is less procyclical than the one of primary earners. It is
also confirmed by the behavior of the flow rates for primary and for secondary earners in
the model and in the data. For instance, in the US data the correlation of the EO flow
with GDP is 0.09 for (married) men and 0.44 for women. In the model the analogous cor-
relations are -0.31 for primary earners and 0.18 for secondary earners. The model predicts
a more negative correlation than the data but the qualitative patterns are matched.
Note that the mild procyclicality of the EO rate has been interpreted as evidence that
workers quit their jobs in expansions (e.g. Hall, 2005). One explanation is that workers
flow to out of the labor force when they have another job lined up (e.g. Nagypa´l, 2005).
Here we show that the behavior of primary and secondary earners is also crucial. This
new channel is complementary to existing theories.
A final comment is in order: When looking at the behavior of these flows, many
researchers have conjectured that the influence of the AWE on the aggregate labor market,
can be traced through the relative behavior of the OU rate across married men and women
(see for example Elsby et al, forthcoming). These flows do not show in the CPS data
substantial differences across population groups. For example, the correlation of the OU
rate in the data is -0.63 for married women and -0.73 for married men. The model produces
similar patterns; it yields -0.79 for primary earners and -0.83 for secondary earners. This
can be explained as follows: First, as we have seen, the OU rate is chiefly influenced by the
changes in the frictions over the cycle (individuals are more likely to flow to unemployment
during recessions than directly to employment). Second, the model predicts that many
secondary earners who become unemployed, are individuals with low wealth and high
productivity. These agents are closer to primary earners, their labor market participation
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is not explained by any family insurance effect. The evidence presented in this section
shows, in the microfounded model, that family insurance influences primarily the EO
rates of secondary earners, along with their employment and participation rates.
6.5 The Behavior of Aggregate Wages and Consumption
To complete this intertemporal analysis we document in Table 15 the cyclical behavior of
wages, consumption and investment.
6.5.1 Wages
First, note that aggregate wages are measured here to correspond to the average wage
value period unit of time (wages divided by hours worked) we observe in the data. As
is shown in the table, wages exhibit different patterns in terms of their cyclical volatil-
ity and the correlation with GDP across the three models. To understand where these
differences derive from, note that in models with heterogeneity, the behavior of average
wages is influenced by the entry and exit decisions of individuals into employment and
the labor force. If entry is procyclical, it means that in economic expansions unproductive
individuals move into employment. The higher entry rate during booms, puts downward
pressure on the measured wage. In contrast, if the entry into the labor force is acyclical,
heterogeneity matters less.
Table 15: Wages, Consumption and Investment: Cyclical Properties
Data Couples Bachelors Complete
ρx,Y
σx
σY
ρx,Y
σx
σY
ρx,Y
σx
σY
ρx,Y
σx
σY
Wages 0.13 0.81 0.73 0.52 0.35 0.40 -0.29 0.40
Consumption 0.83 0.76 0.99 0.74 0.95 0.52 0.95 0.38
Investment 4.50 0.91 0.98 3.11 0.97 2.87 0.98 3.33
Note: The table shows the contemporaneous correlation ρx,Y and the relative standard deviation
σx
σY
between variable x (consumption, wages, investment) and GDP. The data are extracted from
the FRED database for the years 1994-2014. Consumption refers to non-durable goods and
services, wages correspond to hourly compensation in the non-farm business sector, investment
is private investment (fixed capital). All series are logged and HP filtered with smoothing
parameter equal to 1600.
The success of models of heterogeneous agents in producing wages which are not
highly correlated with economic activity has been noted by many authors (see for example
Chang (2000) and the references therein). When labor supply is strongly procyclical,
this mechanism can explain the low correlation between wages and hours worked in the
aggregate data. The results presented in the table suggest however a difficulty with respect
to this argument: when the participation margin is accounted for, models which give a low
correlation between wages and GDP, get the cyclical properties of participation wrong:
they rely on a counterfactually procyclical and volatile entry into the labor force. Under
complete markets, we obtain a negative correlation (-0.29) since the composition effect
is strongest. In the case of incomplete markets and bachelor households this correlation
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turns positive (0.35); the composition effect is weakened because now wealth determines
the entry into the labor force along with productivity. However, in the couples model,
participation is acyclical, and the correlation between wages and output becomes very
positive (0.73).
6.5.2 Consumption
Now consider the behavior of aggregate consumption in the models and in the data: We
obtain a ratio of standard deviations between consumption and output equal to 0.76 in the
US data, 0.74 in the couples model, 0.52 in the bachelors model and 0.38 in the complete
market model. Therefore, the couples model is close to the data observations, the other
models underestimate the relative variability of consumption.38 Moreover, because the
standard deviation of aggregate output is similar across models, these differences remain
even when we look at the standard deviations of consumption.39
To understand these patterns, first note that in the case of incomplete markets (bach-
elors and couples) idiosyncratic risks add to the variability of household consumption and
also increase aggregate volatility, if these risks are correlated with the business cycle. In
our framework this is certainly the case, since unemployment spells last longer in economic
recessions and separations shocks become more frequent. When markets are not complete
households react to the higher income uncertainty through their self-insurance margins:
wealth and joint labor supply. As we have seen, the first margin is less important for cou-
ples, because the second margin becomes available. However, assets in the model are less
risky than labor income, over the cycle. Since couples partly substitute the first for the
second margin, they experience larger drops in consumption during economic recessions.
Another way of saying this is that couples can utilize joint search and labor supply, this
helps to protect them from idiosyncratic uncertainty, at the same time it exposes them
more to the aggregate component of these risks.
7 Extensions and Robustness
7.1 Increasing the Variance of Earnings Shocks
In the couples model, labor supply decisions are taken jointly in the household. Indi-
vidual supply is therefore influenced by the productivity and the labor market status of
the spouse, it is now the joint process of productivity and employment shocks which de-
termine the overall income of the household. It is interesting to investigate whether the
distribution of household earnings is different in the couples model than in the bachelor
38These estimates pertain to our sample period 1994-2014. When we computed the relative variability
of consumption between 1960 and 2006, we obtained of 0.52, the target for this quantity in the early
RBC literature. However, when we used data on personal consumption expenditures (a series which is
also commonly used), the ratio of standard deviations was found 0.84 between 1994 and 2014 and 0.78
between 1960 and 2006.
39For detrended output we obtain 0.0169, 0.0184 and 0.0175 for couples, bachelors and complete mar-
kets, respectively. The consumption standard deviations are 0.0125, 0.0096 and 0.0067. Note that these
patterns cannot be explained by the fact that utility is non-separable between consumption and leisure.
Under complete markets and bachelor households, agents quit the labor force in recessions, this con-
tributes towards mitigating the drop in consumption.
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households model. When we summarize the distribution into the earnings GINI coeffi-
cient we find the following: First, under bachelors, the earnings GINI is 0.52. In the case
of couples, the coefficient for individual earnings is 0.52, but for total family income it is
0.46. Clearly, the joint decisions influence earnings inequality between households since
shocks to productivity and employment shocks are not perfectly correlated within the
household.
Table 16: Higher Uncertainty Model
A: Benchmark B: Higher uncertainty
(Gini=0.46) (Gini=0.52)
E-pop U-rtae LF E-pop U-rate LF
σx
σy
0.72 7.48 0.29 0.58 7.14 0.29
ρx,y 0.87 -0.93 0.32 0.76 -0.94 -0.07
Note: The table shows the results of the benchmark couples model in panel A. The Gini
coefficient of total household earnings in this model is 0.46. Panel B shows the results of
the model when we recalibrate the income process to generate a Gini coefficient of 0.52
that is to the value we obtain in the bachelors model. The results are the aggregate labor
market statistic (employment, unemployment and participation). The behavior of wages
consumption and investment for this model are discussed in the online appendix.
We now test the predictions of the couples model when we target the family income
GINI of the bachelors model. To accomplish this we follow De Nardi (2004) and increase
the variance of the shocks to productivity. We find that if the standard deviation σ
becomes 1.5 times as large as under the benchmark calibration, we get a GINI index of
0.52.40
The cyclical moments are presented in Table 16 (along with the benchmark calibration
for convenience). Note that with the higher uncertainty in income, the participation rate
becomes negatively correlated with aggregate economic activity. Not surprisingly, the
cyclical volatility of aggregate employment drops slightly. Obviously, the larger are the
shocks to the household’s labor income, the less cyclical fluctuations matter for labor
supply decisions. Put differently, now individuals join the labor force responding more
to idiosyncratic productivity and less to the business cycle. Our previous findings on the
importance of joint search, to match the business cycle correlations, remain though.
7.2 Reducing the Importance of Non-Searchers
Both the couples and the bachelors models predict in equilibrium a large fraction of
agents who exert “job hoarding behavior”. These agents are wealthy, and in response to a
40Notice that to get a GINI coefficient of 0.63 (Census Data), it does not suffice to increase the variance
assuming a symmetric distribution (as we do). A substantially larger GINI can only derive from making
the distribution skewed to reflect top coded earnings (e.g. Castaneda et al., 2003).
As discussed previously, it seems unlikely that adjusting the process to incorporate individuals with 6
digit annual earnings is important for the participation margin. Moreover, compared to the rest of the
literature of infinite horizon incomplete market models, our benchmark GINI is already quite high (see
Table 1 in Castaneda et al. (2003) for a summary of different papers).
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χ shock, they drop out of the labor force. Non searchers are also present under complete
markets, even in the absence of wealth effects; the planner keeps some agents employed
even if their productivity is low. At the arrival of a χ shock these individuals flow out of
the labor force.
The feature of the model which gives rise to the job hoarding behavior, is that search
is costly. Search costs under the baseline calibration are high, reducing them will help
reduce the number of non-searchers. However, notice that if we lower κ arbitrarily, we have
another problem; the unemployment rate increases above the target. To see this consider
the following extreme scenario: suppose we set κ to zero and maintain p(s, λs) > p(s, λs).
Then, all agents will prefer to become unemployed.41 We must therefore bring p(s, λs)
closer to p(s, λs) when we lower κ.
In Table 17, we increase the probability p(s, λ) ∈ {0.19, 0.22, 0.25} keeping p(s, λ) =
0.26 in each model. We set κ to match the unemployment rate target. As the first column
of the table shows, the value of κ now drops significantly. When we set p(s, λ) = 0.25
(bottom panel) we obtain for every model κ = 0.02. This means that unemployed workers
spend in market activities roughly 6% of the time employed workers do.
In the second column of the table we show the fraction of non-searchers over the
population: The top panel shows the numbers from the baseline calibration; in the bottom
panel we show that non-searchers represent roughly 6% of the population when we set κ =
0.02. Clearly, the fractions are still higher than the data moment (2%). This illustrates
that job hoarding is a very persistent feature of the economic mechanism imparted by the
model.
As we know, under incomplete markets, individuals accumulate assets for self-insurance
and drop out of the labor force when they become sufficiently wealthy. Because of these
decision rules, the models always give a large mass of agents in the critical region of non-
searchers. Moreover, note that when we increase the value of p(s, λs), there is a strong
composition effect: the pool of employed individuals now tilts more towards wealthier
agents; these are more likely to become non-searchers. A similar composition effect ac-
counts for the patterns we see under complete markets. However, now the key variable is
not wealth, but individual productivity.42
The performance of the models over the business cycle is as follows: First, in the
couples model, the cyclicality of participation is further reduced relative to the benchmark.
We obtain a value of 0.09 when we set p(s, λs) = 0.19 and a value of -0.33 for p(s, λs) =
0.25. Second, there is a reduction in the correlation of labor force participation with GDP
also in the case of complete markets. Nevertheless, even when the correlation is 0.42
(p(s, λs) = 0.22) the complete market allocation gives a volatile participation margin.
Finally, in the case of the bachelor households model, there is no significant improvement
in these moments relative the benchmark.
To understand these findings note first that higher separation shocks induce employed
individuals to drop out of the labor force in recessions. Therefore, when we reduce the
41In the limit p(s, λ) = p(s, λ) we need to set κ = 0 as the only feasible value. However, we then also
need to increase the arrival rate of offers to a very large value (above 0.45) to target an unemployment
rate of 6.2 percent. In effect, unemployment becomes a less important risk to the household.
42In other words, in the case of complete markets the fraction of non-searchers is persistently high
because the less productive agents now find jobs at a higher rate. In equilibrium, there is a larger mass
of agents who once get hit by a χ shock, flow out of the labor force.
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Table 17: Changing the frictions
κ % NS E-pop U-rate LF ρE,LF
σE,Y ρE,Y σU,Y ρU,Y σLF,Y ρLF,Y
A: p
(
s, λ¯
)
= 0.16
Couples 0.24 0.090 0.71 0.87 7.49 -0.94 0.29 0.32 0.71
Bachelors 0.25 0.092 0.94 0.91 7.27 -0.93 0.54 0.76 0.94
Complete Markets 0.26 0.087 1.18 0.95 8.62 -0.95 0.63 0.85 0.97
B: p
(
s, λ¯
)
= 0.19
Couples 0.17 0.080 0.67 0.87 8.03 -0.94 0.25 0.09 0.54
Bachelors 0.17 0.081 0.84 0.93 7.94 -0.93 0.40 0.78 0.93
Complete Markets 0.19 0.071 0.94 0.90 9.28 -0.95 0.41 0.50 0.81
C: p
(
s, λ¯
)
= 0.22
Couples 0.09 0.071 0.66 0.87 8.58 -0.95 0.24 -0.13 0.36
Bachelors 0.06 0.072 0.79 0.92 8.57 -0.94 0.30 0.78 0.94
Complete Markets 0.07 0.066 0.95 0.89 9.62 -0.96 0.48 0.42 0.89
D: p
(
s, λ¯
)
= 0.25
Couples 0.02 0.063 0.66 0.86 9.08 -0.95 0.25 -0.33 0.16
Bachelors 0.02 0.064 0.80 0.90 9.16 -0.95 0.31 0.64 0.90
Complete Markets 0.02 0.057 1.06 0.90 9.85 -0.95 0.59 0.66 0.90
Note: The table shows the results of the three models when the probability of receiving a
job offer for out of the labor force workers is increased relative to the benchmark calibration
which is repeated for convenience in panel A. Panel B shows the case where p
(
s, λ¯
)
= 0.19,
panel C where p
(
s, λ¯
)
= 0.22 and panel D where p
(
s, λ¯
)
= 0.25. κ the cost of search
parameter. %NS is the fraction of non-searchers over the population. σx,Y is the ratio of
the standard deviation of x relative to GDP. ρx,Y is the correlation coefficient between x
and Y . The last column of the table shows the correlation coefficient between labor force
participation and employment (ρE,LF ) which in the data is 0.69.
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number of non searchers, the effects from this channel become weaker. This may explain
why (in some models) the contemporaneous correlation of participation with GDP drops.
Second, the composition effects discussed previously, are also crucial. They yield a larger
fraction of unproductive agents in employment under complete markets, and increase the
wealth of the employed when markets are incomplete. This differentiates the impact of
the business cycle between the models. Under the complete market we now have relatively
less individuals close to the unemployment-out of the labor force threshold; this makes the
intertemporal substitution effect weaker. The opposite holds in the case of incomplete
markets and bachelor households. As we saw previously, (see for example Figure 7)
productive and wealthy agents are more responsive to the shift in the expected search
costs over the cycle.
In the couples model the higher arrival rates of offers to out of the labor force indi-
viduals, means a larger inflow of secondary earners in the labor force during recessions.
This effect is pivotal to explain the patterns that we see in the table.
In the final column of the table we provide another statistic which summarizes the
performance of the models in matching the participation margin; the correlation between
the labor force and aggregate employment. In the de-trended US data this correlation
is in the order of 0.69. It echoes the fact that decreases in the employment population
ratio in the historical US observations are not accompanied by drops in the labor force
participation of similar magnitude, the unemployment population ratio increases to absorb
most of the difference (see for example Shimer, 2009). The performance of the models is as
follows: The benchmark couples model gives 0.71 for this correlation and therefore fits the
data very well. When we increase p(s, λs) in that model, we get much lower correlations,
because now secondary earners become more important for the aggregate statistics. The
bachelors and complete market models give correlations close to 0.9, considerably higher
than the data moment.
In the online appendix we consider an alternative avenue to minimize the impact of
non-searchers in the models. We assume that the separation shocks χ remain constant
over the business cycle as they typically do in search and matching models (e.g. Pissarides,
1984; Shimer, 2005). This assumption reduces the correlation of participation with GDP.
However, the same problems arise with the bachelors and the complete market models,
namely the labor force is very volatile and the correlation between employment and the
labor force remains counterfactually high. Assuming constant separation is unappealing
for an additional reason: in the models it makes the flows from E to U procyclical.
7.3 Models without Frictions
We now briefly describe the effects of removing the frictions from the economy, through
setting p(s, λ) = p(s, λ) = 1. This model under incomplete markets has been studied by
Chang and Kim (2006, 2007) and Gomes et al. (2001) and under complete markets by
Gourio and Noual (2006) among others.
In the absence of frictions, unemployment is not defined. The labor force is the sum
of all employed individuals. Since the properties of these models are not new in the
literature, we describe them in detail in the online appendix. We show that across all
models we obtain a very procyclical participation; the contemporaneous correlation with
GDP exceeds 0.9 in all cases.
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Note that in the case of the couples model, the fact that the correlation between
participation and output is very large when we remove the frictions, suggests that it is
crucial to maintain unemployment as an important risk to the household for our results
in this paper. Without frictions, individuals can choose whether or not to work, and it
is no longer necessary for secondary earners to join the labor force during recessions to
provide insurance.
7.4 Log -Separable Preferences
For the benchmark model we have assumed that consumption and hours are non-sparable
in utility. In this section, we investigate whether this specification of preferences drives our
results. Therefore, we now set γ = 1 so that utility is of the form: ηlogcit+(1−η)log(1−lit).
In Table 18 we show the average labor market flows in the steady state.43 As can be
seen from the table, there is virtually no effect from assuming log separable utility on the
estimated transition probabilities. The flows are very similar to the values in Table 9.
Table 18: Steady State Flows: Log Utility
A: Couples B: Bachelors C: Complete Markets
To To To
From E U O E U O E U O
E 0.956 0.010 0.034 0.947 0.007 0.046 0.958 0.011 0.031
U 0.257 0.672 0.071 0.257 0.685 0.058 0.257 0.672 0.071
O 0.062 0.032 0.906 0.049 0.033 0.918 0.046 0.018 0.936
Note: The table shows average transition probabilities across labor market states from
the 3 models: Panel A shows the baseline with couple households, panel B shows
the model of bachelor households, and panel C shows the complete market model. E
represents employment, U unemployment and O out of the labor force.
In the online appendix we show (analytically) that preferences do not matter at all in
the case of complete markets, as long as we keep the targets for employment and unem-
ployment constant. As discussed previously, under complete markets the family needs
to determine two thresholds; the first governs the transitions between E and O, and the
second, between U and O. We establish that these thresholds are solely functions of the
process of . Preferences can be identified ex post to satisfy the first order conditions of
the planning problem. In the case of incomplete markets, this property need not hold.
The difficulty is that now it is not only productivity that matters; wealth becomes an
important state variable and the flow rates are determined along with the endogenous
wealth distribution. However, the findings presented in the table suggest that preferences
do not exert any significant influence also in this case.44
43Note that for each of the three models, we recalibrated η, κ and β to find an equilibrium consistent
with the targets. The details are contained in the online appendix.
44In the online appendix we show that the wealth distribution is unaffected by the change in preference.
The general equilibrium effect (that we recalibrated β to match the interest rate target) is crucial for this
finding.
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Now consider the results from the business cycle version of the model under log prefer-
ences. The summary statistics for employment, unemployment and labor force participa-
tion are illustrated in Table 18. The moments should be compared with the results of the
benchmark calibration (Table 11) to discern whether preferences matter for the business
cycle patterns. They do not! In particular, in the incomplete market models considered,
we obtain very similar correlations and relative ratios of standard deviations for each
variable, to the benchmark calibration. There are only minor differences in the case of
the complete market allocation, we now find that labor force participation exhibits even
more volatility; this causes a rise in the cyclical volatility of employment. Nevertheless,
the results are very close to the benchmark. In the online appendix we have a detailed
discussion of these results where we also show that the behavior of wages, consumption
and investment is very close to the benchmark economy.
A final comment is in order: Many papers have shown that the specification of prefer-
ences is important for the behavior of macroeconomic models. For example, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2007) have demon-
strated that preferences are crucial for the propagation of government spending shocks.
Hall (2009) reaches a similar conclusion when he tries to reconcile the historical changes
in the marginal value of time with the movements in the product of labor in the US.
Basu and Kimball (2002) show that when consumption and leisure are non-separable,
the household Euler equation can be made consistent with the responses of consumption
to anticipated changes in labor income.45 We show here that in a model in which labor
supply is formed at the extensive margin and there are frictions in the labor market, af-
ter accounting for general equilibrium effects the specification of preferences is not at all
important, neither for labor market flows nor for business cycle fluctuations. This result
should be of separate interest.
Table 19: Business Cycle Properties: Log Utility
Data Couples Bachelors Complete
ρx,Y
E-pop 0.81 0.87 0.91 0.93
U-rate -0.90 -0.94 -0.94 -0.95
LF 0.34 0.30 0.72 0.82
σx,Y
E-pop 0.86 0.71 0.91 1.17
U-rate 10.15 7.51 7.45 8.59
LF 0.27 0.27 0.47 0.64
Note: The table shows the business cycle properties of the aggregate labor market for
the log utility model. Column 3 shows the same data as Table 1 where also details
about the data can be found. Column 4 shows the corresponding result of the couples
model, column 5 of the bachelors model and column 6 of the complete market model.
All series are logged and HP filtered with smoothing parameter equal to 1600.
45More generally the specification of preferences is intimately related with the consumption puzzles in
the early literature (see for example Cochrane (1991) and the literature on the consumption retirement
puzzle).
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7.5 Welfare Costs of Aggregate Fluctuations
We now compute the welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations in our benchmark models.
In particular, for each of the models considered we ask “what is the percentage increment
in consumption, needed so that individuals are on average as well off living in an econ-
omy with economic fluctuations, as they would be if business cycles were completely
eliminated?” We derive the coefficient of compensating variation through comparing the
aggregate uncertainty models (Section 5) with the steady state versions discussed in Sec-
tion 4. In particular we compute the value ξ˜ which satisfies:46
∑
(ij):i,j∈{e,n}
∫
Eb
∑
βt
2∑
i=1
u(cit(1 + ξ˜), l
i
t)dΓ
ij
s +
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s +
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∑
βt
2∑
i=1
u(cit, l
i
t)dΓ
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s
where Eb denotes the expectation operator in the presence of aggregate fluctuations and
Enb the analogous object when we eliminate business cycles. Moreover, Γs is the long run
steady state distribution of households across the state space. For brevity we omit the
analogous expressions for bachelors and complete markets.
Table 20: Welfare Costs of Business Cycles
Couples Bachelors Complete
ξ˜ 0.83% 0.96% 0.54%
Note: The table shows the compensating variation, the percentage increment in con-
sumption required by individuals in the economy with business cycle fluctuations to
be as well off as they would be in an economy without fluctuations. See the online
appendix for details about the calculations.
46Other papers which compute the welfare costs of fluctuations in heterogeneous agent economies follow
different approaches: Imrohorog˘lu (1989) reconstructs the steady state version of her model so that
average duration of unemployment is the same as in aggregate uncertainty version of her model. Krusell,
Mukoyama, S¸ahin, and Smith (2009) propose a similar correction, mapping their two state (employment,
unemployment) aggregate uncertainty model, into a three state model without fluctuations (employed,
short and long term unemployed ). Our approach which follows Gomes et al. (2001), simply removes
the business cycle through setting λt to the average value, and the arrival rates of offers and separation
probabilities equal to their steady state values. We adopt this approach for two main reasons: First,
because since in the model the choice of labor market status is important, the approach of Krusell et al.
(2009) cannot be easily applied in our context. Second, we are mainly interested here in comparing
the welfare costs across the three economies, any other approach considered in the literature should be
equivalent in terms of this comparison.
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The results are displayed in Table 20. In the bachelors model we obtain a compensating
variation equal to 0.96%; in the couples model we obtain 0.84%, and in the case of the
complete market economy, we get 0.54%. Notice that these values are at least an order of
magnitude larger than the analogous values in Lucas (1987). However, our welfare measure
is not based on the variability of consumption; if we had performed the calculation based
on aggregate consumption data, then the welfare costs would be larger in the couples
model; as we saw previously, the couples model gives us the most volatile consumption
series.
We can explain this pattern as follows: It is well known, that in models where con-
sumption risks are not purely aggregate, but also idiosyncratic, the welfare costs of fluc-
tuations are convex in the overall background economic risk that households face. The
larger the overall risk, the larger the welfare gain from eliminating the small fraction of
uncertainty attributed to business cycles. This argument is discussed, for example, in
De Santis (2007).
We previously explained that households in the couples model are able to ward off
idiosyncratic risks through joint labor supply. This presents them with the tradeoff: Since
jobs are risky assets (over the cycle) relying on family insurance (as opposed to insurance
through the financial market) increases the exposure of consumption to business cycle
shocks. This, however, does not translate into a larger welfare gain from eliminating
business cycles because the overall background economic risk (aggregate + idiosyncratic)
does not increase.
To demonstrate this point, we have calculated the idiosyncratic consumption uncer-
tainty in the two incomplete market models (bachelors and couples). In particular, we
computed the between household variance of the log of consumption. We obtained the
following: First, the cross sectional variance in the bachelors model is roughly 40 per-
cent larger than in the couples model (0.352 vs. 0.252). Second, as we saw previously,
the volatility of aggregate consumption is several times smaller than the idiosyncratic
risk households face (the variances were 0.01252 for the couples model and 0.00962 under
bachelors). These patterns are consistent with the above argument.
Finally, to understand why the welfare costs are substantial in all the economies con-
sidered, note that with search frictions in the labor market, economic fluctuations lead
to a drop in the average employment rate. This is because aggregate employment is a
non-linear function of the job finding probability (p(s, λ) and p(s, λ)). The more volatile
the cycle, the lower is aggregate employment, this level effect increases considerably the
welfare costs from fluctuations. This point has been made by Hairault, Langot, and Oso-
timehin (2010). This property holds also in our models; The employment population ratio
in simulations is lowered by roughly 0.2 percentage points in the models, thus making the
welfare costs of business cycles sizable. In the online appendix we also show the cross
sectional patterns of the welfare costs in the incomplete market models.
8 Conclusion
The findings of this paper are easy to summarize. We have shown that families provide
insurance against labor income risks, and in particular against unemployment shocks.
When the primary earner of a household becomes unemployed, the secondary earner joins
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the labor force. In the US data this pattern emerges clearly when we look at married
couples.
We then construct a general equilibrium model in the spirit of the heterogeneous
agents literature. We add a second member to the household. We demonstrate that
this new framework can be used to explain a persistent puzzle: that participation in
the labor market in the historical US data is not strongly procyclical, as macroeconomic
models typically predict. The couple households model that we propose in this paper can
resolve this puzzle. It is able to do so because the family insurance effect that we identify
counterbalances the standard intertemporal substitution channel of the business cycle.
Our model brings together the two key mechanisms which in macroeconomic the-
ory have been widely used to explain fluctuations in the aggregate labor market: search
frictions which have been shown to be important for primary earners, and neoclassical
reservation wage arguments which are important for secondary earners. A considerable
body of literature has claimed that secondary earners are likely to be important for fluctu-
ations in aggregate employment since these individuals typically show in empirical studies
a larger elasticity of labor supply. The data on the employment and participation patterns
of married women show quite the opposite. The employment of married women is not
strongly procyclical and is not volatile. Participation in the labor market is countercycli-
cal. The model we present in this paper is consistent with these patterns.
Our analysis focuses on the macroeconomic implications of joint household search. A
number of extensions of the framework and of the analysis presented can be fruitful. First,
by bringing to the model a more elaborate life cycle structure, we can quantify the welfare
benefit from insurance against unemployment risks. Second, it is important to understand
better the effects of the presence of family members other than married women in the
household. Most of the “single agents” we find in the data are young individuals living
with their parents. Further research is needed to investigate whether these individuals
can be viewed as secondary earners. A preliminary reading of the data indicates that this
is not obvious. The complex patterns merits further study.
A number of policy implications also emerge from this paper. Because families can
insure themselves against unemployment risks, they need to rely less on precautionary
savings. A large body of literature has shown that the incentive of households to accu-
mulate wealth to buffer shocks to labor income, firstly, is more urgent when shocks are
temporary (e.g. unemployment shocks) and, secondly exerts an important influence on
policy. These effects can be studied further through the lenses of the theory and the
evidence presented in this paper.
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